Tradução da Margarida:
Gostaria de clarificar que a decisão de adoptar o Português foi tomada ÑÃO PELOS LÍDERES mas pelos apoiantes dos partidos políticos que emergiram em 1974 depois da "Revolução dos Cravos ". Foi depois decidido pela Convenção da CNRT realizada em Peniche, Portugal, em Abril 1998 e depois pelo Congresso realizado em Setembro 2000 Dili. O Congresso apoiou a decisão unânimamente.
Se os Australianos são realmente nossos amigos devem respeitar o que o povo decidiu através dos seus partidos políticos e Convenções e Congressos do CNRT.
O inglês é muito importante para nós, os Timorenses, mas por favor, amigos da Austrália, não nos forcem a adoptar o inglês como nossa língua oficial e por favor acabem com a guerra contra o português, porque a escolha pela língua portuguesa é exclusivamente nossa.
Portugal não tem nada a ver com isso.
Para informação geral, como consequência dos esforços feitos por professores de Portugal, Brasil e outros países de língua portuguesa, incluindo professores Timorenses, 25% dos Timorenses falam português agora.
quinta-feira, agosto 10, 2006
Tradução da Margarida:
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 20:38
Tradução da Margarida.
Stephen Fitzpatrick, correspondente em Jakarta
10 Agosto 06
Um dos funcionários de topo da Indonésia admitiu que o seu país foi directamente responsável pelo falhanço em parar o caos assassino que acompanhou a sua retirada de Timor-Leste em 1998.
Dino Patti Djalal, um membro de topo do Ministério dos Estrangeiros na altura, disse que a retirada foi conduzida de modo "irracional" e que Jakarta nunca mostrou "coração e vontade para restringir " os grupos de milícias apoiados pela Indonésia que mataram milhares depois do referendo da independência do Leste de Timor em 1999.
Falando no lançamento duma análise do período do antigo ministro dos Estrangeiros Ali Alatas, Mr Djalal – agora porta-voz oficial do Presidente Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – fez um pedido apaixonado para a Indonésia aprender com os seus erros no Leste de Timor.
Disse que se essas lições não fossem aprendidas "por funcionários políticos e funcionários de segurança, não seria possível solucionar os problemas de Aceh, Poso e Papua" – todos nações que têm experimentado revoltas étnicas e nacionalistas extremas. Aceh chegou recentemente a uma nova lei de autonomia depois duma luta de décadas pela independência.
No lançamento do seu livro, A pedra no sapato: a luta diplomática por Timor-Leste, Mr Alatas reclamou que os 24 anos de ocupação do regime de Suharto do pequeno país foi mais benigno do que é geralmente reconhecido e que foi o errático sucessor de Suharto, BJ Habibie, que foi responsável por decisões pobres.
Falando da assistência durante a sessão de perguntas e respostas que se seguiu, Mr Djalal foi mais longe, dizendo que a Indonésia tinha gerido mal Timor-Leste mas pondo a culpa pelo caos que acompanhou a sua retirada redondamente nas costas do Dr Habibie.
Dr Habibie, que substituira o ditador Suharto em 1998, respondeu petulantemente a uma carta de John Howard no final do mesmo ano sugerindo uma opção de autonomia para o Leste de Timor. A sua oferta de um referendo propondo a independência ou a integração com a Indonésia foi feita à pressa e sem ter em consideração "a situação no terreno ", disse Mr Djalal.
"Quando me enviou para o Leste de Timor para avaliar a situação (em 1999), era claro que as pessoas lá não estavam preparadas, não conheciam o conceito (de independência)," disse Mr Djalal ao seu antigo patrão, Mr Alatas.
"Passei muitas noitas sem dormir a pensar nisto porque pusemos um colete de forças no calendário do referendo e tudo porque BJ Habibie queria levar o resultado ao MPR (o órgão superior do parlamento da Indonésia). Não era racional.
"Pensámos que bastava distribuir muito dinheiro e que isso significaria qualquer coisa. Errámos. O Leste de Timor tornou-se um Estado policial, estávamos a subornar pessoas que pensávamos que eram leais connosco, e a fazer coisas terríveis a pessoas que pensávamos que não eram leais connosco."
O governo excêntrico e imprevisto do Dr Habibie tem sido criticado no exterior da Indonésia mas a declaração de ontem à noite esteve entre as mais fortes feitas a nível oficial em Jakarta.
A avaliação de Mr Djalal foi apoiada ontem à noite por uma figura de topo da administração de Suharto, o antigo ministro da indústria Hartato, que disse da assistência que a ocupação de Timor-Leste foi "ainda um problema extremamente importante para a Indonésia" e que "deve tornar-se uma questão de extrema introspecção para nós – Concordo bastante com o que o jovem disse ".
Mr Alatas respondeu ao comentário de Mr Djalal concordando que a Indonésia deve aprender com os seus erros no Leste de Timor e ter cuidado " em não descuidar os nossos problemas na região, tais como em Aceh e na Papua".
O antigo Embaixador na Austrália Sabam Siagian, ao contrário de Mr Djalal um orador oficial no lançamento da noite passada, avisou que havia ainda uma aproximação poderosamente centrada em Java ao modo como as ilhas exteriores da Indonésia eram administradas, algo que tinha contribuído para o desastre de Timor-Leste e podia continuar a criar problemas.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 19:48
Tradução da Margarida.
Portugis é a maneira indonésia de dizer Português.
A língua portuguesa foi escolhida pela liderança de Timor-Leste porque é uma língua que permitirá a todos nós timorenses evoluirmos num mundo moderno sem assassinar as nossas línguas nacionais.
Como devia saber, os países que adoptaram o inglês como língua oficial, têm testemunhado o vagaroso assassinato das suas ancestrais línguas, culturas e tradições.
Se Timor-Leste tivesse adoptado o inglês como língua oficial, num período de 50 anos, a música, literatura e tradições de Timor-Leste não seriam diferentes das dos territórios do Norte da Austrália. Timor-Leste teria então perdido a sua própria identidade. O mesmo aconteceria se o Bahasa indonésio fosse adoptado como língua nacional.
Por outro lado, Portugal está demasiado longe e está integrado na Comunidade Europeia, por isso os nossos líderes perceberam, que não havia risco de sermos colonizados. Deve saber também que o comportamento de Portugal com Timor-Leste não tem relação nenhuma com a de um poder colonizador. Pelo contrário. A sua declaração podia ser considerada ofensiva pelo povo português que gastou tanto dinheiro dos seus impostos para ajudar Timor-Leste.
Muitos timorenses não falam português por várias razões:
1. No século XVIII, os padres jesuítas que tinham montado muitas escolas em Timor foram mandados embora pelo rei de Portugal. Assim, durante muitos anos não houve escolas em Timor. Mesmo em Portugal quase todas as escolas eram da igreja nessa altura.
2. Como um país pequeno e pobre, Portugal não teve recursos para montar escolas em todo o lado. Somente nos anos 1970s o sistema escolar em Timor começou a chegar aos sub distritos.
3. Os invasores indonésios proibiram a fala do português, apreenderam todos os livros e discos de música portuguesa que encontraram para acelerar a assimilação da população, depois enviaram milhares de professores de Java e doutras ilhas para nos pôr a falar o bahasa indonésio.
Se é um apoiante de um Timor-Leste independente, deve insistir em falar tétum e português. Desse modo asseguramos que no futuro, permaneceremos diferentes dos nossos vizinhos. Não assimilados por eles.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 19:45
Tradução da Margarida:
The Guardian 9 Agosto, 2006
Timor-Leste: problemas presentes; estratégias futuras
Para os que têm apoiado a independência de Timor-Leste (TL) há 30 anos, Timorenses e outros, os eventos que lá ocorrem nos últimos meses são de partir o coração. Muitos líderes do mundo descrevem TL como um Estado falhado — assim o fazem particularmente líderes políticos da Austrália que têm trabalhado sem descanso para empurrar a remoção do antigo Primeiro-Ministro de TL Mari Alkatiri.
Muitas das análises dos media acerca dos eventos em TL têm-se centrado à volta da performance e da personalidade de Alkatiri. A meu ver isto é muito naïve e tem escondido tentativas para realçar os muitos outros factores que contribuíram para a crise.
Tem de ser admitido que os líderes de TL fizeram alguns erros. Provavelmente, o pior foi o despedimento de quase 600 membros das FDTL (as forças de defesa de TL) no seguimento de protestos sobre condições em Março 2006.Isto levou a divisões que podiam ter sido evitadas se tivesse havido algumas tentativas para responder às suas queixas com mais simpatia. Um FALANTIL (Forças Armadas Nacionais para a Libertação de Timor-Leste) que conheço pessoalmente queixou-se-me que Alkatiri não escutou as preocupações dos veteranos e não os tratou com respeito.
Muitos dos problemas dentro da PNTL (a força de polícia de TL) têm sido imputados ao antigo Ministro do Interior, Rogério Lobato, caído em desgraça, que tem sido acusado de ter treinado os seus membros para ser uma força opositora das FDTL.
Tem de ser dito que os políticos da Austrália contribuíram largamente para os problemas que TL enfrenta. Durante os 24 anos da ocupação militar Indonésia (TNI), a Austrália deu apoio militar e diplomático à Indonésia.
Em 1999, quando a ONU estava a planear o referendo para a independência de TL, foram os líderes Australianos que insistiram que não eram necessários capacetes azuis da ONU e que uma operação de policiamento providenciaria segurança suficiente. O resultado foi que TL ganhou a sua independência, mas viu a morte de mais 2000 dos seus cidadãos e a destruição de 80 por cento da sua infra-estrutura.
TL, a mais pobre nação no SE Ásia, tem o mais baixo PIB per capita GDP do mundo ($400 pa) com cerca de 40 por cento da sua população a viver abaixo da linha de pobreza de 55 USA cêntimos por dia.
Oitenta por cento da população tem menos de 18 anos de idade e o desemprego excede 50 por cento. Em adição, o British Medical Journal Lancet, que fez um estudo sobre as necessidades de saúde mental em TL identificou que números significativos de pessoas têm desordens de stress pós traumático e outros problemas psicológicos porque testemunharam a tortura, violação ou homicídio de familiares ou amigos.
A acrescentar às acções de membros amotinados da PNTL e das FDTL, pouca menção tem sido feita nos media principais a antigos grupos de milícias e a grupos milenários (ex. Colimau 2000) que têm contribuído para muita da violência oportunística.
Apesar dos criticismos dele, tem de se reconhecer que Alkatiri jogou um papel vital na liderança de TL. Foi um dos principais arquitectos do Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense (CNRT). A razão porque é detestado pelos líderes políticos Australianos é porque enfrentou as suas fanfarronadas nas negociações do petróleo e gás do Mar de Timor. Tem jogado um papel principal em manter a economia de TL fora das mãos do Banco Mundial e do FMI. Seria interessante ver se o PM interino José Ramos Horta terá o mesmo sucesso em relação a isto.
Alkatiri é responsável por trazer médicos Cubanos para TL para trabalharem nas áreas rurais e fundarem uma nova escola médica na universidade nacional. É sabido que tem preocupações com questões ambientais e das mulheres e é um opositor da privatização de electricidade de TL.
Se for provado que foi responsável pelo armamento de milícias não oficiais, obviamente que isso é uma matéria séria. Contudo, na maioria das democracias, ser-lhe-ia pedido que se afastasse — não que resignasse — até as alegações serem refutadas. Penso que a decisão de Xanana de o forçar a resignar foi errada e insensata. Antagonizará ainda mais os da linha dura na FRETILIN que têm sido seus críticos.
Com todos estes problemas, que passos é preciso dar para o desenvolvimento e a reconstrução de TL?
É preciso tomar as seguintes medidas para apoiar TL a proteger a sua segurança:
Capacetes azuis da ONU precisam de permanecer em TL durante alguns anos
TL precisa certamente de mais assistência com o recrutamento e treino da sua força policial
Capacetes azuis e polícias internacionais precisam de continuar presentes na região da fronteira até a polícia de fronteira de TL e as FDTL terem capacidade para pararem efectivamente incursões da TNI, das suas milícias e dos seus contrabandistas
A ONU precisa de pressionar o Governo Indonésio para assegurar que todos os grupos de milícias treinados pelo TNI na fronteira de TL/Oeste Timor sejam desmantelados e que seja removidas para longe das fronteiras as presentes divisões da TNI
A ONU deve insistir que todas as nações membros cessem todas as formas de cooperação militar com o TNI até todos os criminosos de guerra nas suas fileiras terem sido trazidos à justiça
A ONU precisa de fundar um tribunal internacional para crimes de guerra para julgar os criminosos de guerra que estão nas fileiras do TNI e as suas milícias
Este tribunal precisa de ter poderes de extradição e as nações membros da ONU têm de compelidas a cooperar com o tribunal e a extraditar qualquer alegado criminoso da TNI que seja encontrado no interior das suas fronteiras
O Governo Australiano precisa de ser pressionado pela ONU e pela comunidade internacional para:
Assinar a Lei Internacional do Mar
Entregar todos os ganhos do petróleo/gás que tem tirado da metade de TL do Mar de Timor desde que começaram as perfurações
O Governo Indonésio deve ser obrigado a pagar compensações por toda a destruição que foi causada pelos seus militares em TL.
A ONU devia providenciar empréstimos sem taxas e dádivas para:
financiar programas humanitários urgentemente necessários
fundar indústrias e esquemas de criação de empregos
reconstruir a indústria de cultivo de arroz
Treino e administração
Será necessário que a ONU com o apoio de nações amigas permaneça mais tempo em TL para providenciar apoio administrativo e treino à nova nação.
A ONU presentemente está comprometida em ficar mais dois anos. O PM Ramos Horta acredita que é necessário um compromisso de 10 anos.
Respeito pela soberania de TL
Tem havido muito debate sobre os motivos da Austrália querer enviar os seus soldados antes de tal ter sido pedido pelos líderes políticos de TL. Tem de haver acordo internacional entre todas as nações que lidam com TL para respeitar a sua soberania tanto em terra como no mar e não procurar lucrar injustamente à custa desta nação neste inicial e tão precário estádio da sua reconstrução e desenvolvimento.
Acredito que se as estratégias acima (descritas) forem tomadas, TL será capaz de ultrapassar os seus muitos problemas e construir um futuro com mais sucesso para os seus corajosos e há muito sofredores cidadãos.
*Andy Alcock é o responsável de Informação da Associação de Amizade Austrália-Timor-Leste (South Australia Inc) Inc
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 18:01
I would just like to clarify that the decision of adopting the Portuguese has been made NOT BY THE LEADERS but by the supportwers of the political parties which emerged in 1974 after the "Carnation Revolution". It was then decided by the CNRT's Convention held at Peniche, Portugal,in April 1998 and then Congress held in September 2000 Dili. The Congress has approved the decision unanimously.
If the Australians are really our friends they should respect what the people has decided through their politcal aprties and CNRT's Convention and Congress.
English is very important for us the East Timorese, but please, friends from Australia, do not force us to adopt English as our official language and please stop making war against the Portuguese, because the choice for the Portuguese language is exclusive ours.
Portugal has nothing to do with it.
For general information, as consequence of efforts made by teachers from Portugal, Brazil and other Portugese speaking countries, including the East Timorese teachers, 25% of East Timorese speak Portuguese now.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 18:01
August 10, 2006
THE Government would prefer a new mission to East Timor to be led by Australia rather than the United Nations, Defence Minister Brendan Nelson said today.~
But Dr Nelson said it was premature to canvas a timetable and duration for that mission.
He rejected a suggestion of a minimum five-year mission proposed by East Timor Prime Minister Jose Ramos Horta.
Dr Nelson said that wasn't the type of timetable the Government was considering.
He said Australian troop numbers in East Timor, which peaked at 1300 on the ground following unrest earlier this year, were now being reduced in consultation with the East Timorese government.
"As far as the length of commitment, we are negotiating through the United Nations at the moment whether we will have a UN-led multinational security force or whether we will have one led with green helmets," he told ABC radio.
"Our preference is for the second led by Australia.
"But as far as how long we will be there, as with all of our deployments, it will be decided in consultation with the East Timorese government and the UN and based on an assessment of security.
"There will be a policing presence there for probably longer than a military one.
"But whilst having the highest regard for Jose Ramos Horta, at this stage it is a bit premature for us to be talking about numbers of years that we will be there."
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 17:57
August 10, 2006
Abdul Khalik, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
Ali Alatas learned how to navigate his way around the corridors of power as a highly respected diplomat, including serving as foreign minister in the Soeharto and Habibie administrations.
Those diplomatic skills were put to the test in the thorny problem of the then East Timor, with Alatas detailing his struggle in the aptly titled The Pebble in the Shoe -- The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor.
It was officially launched at the National Archives building in West Jakarta on Wednesday, with remarks by noted journalist Aristides Katoppo, Indonesia's former permanent representative to the UN Nugroho Wisnumurti and former ambassador to Australia and director of The Jakarta Post Sabam Siagian.
Katoppo is also a representative of both Aksara Kurnia and United in Diversity that published the book.
Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda, prominent figures and several foreign ambassadors attended the Wednesday's launching ceremony.
Nugroho praised the factual strength of the 330-page book, with more new details than previous books on Timor Leste, including on why Indonesia decided to enter East Timor, the series of diplomatic meetings and negotiations between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, and the how decision was made to give Timor Leste what a popular consultation that led to its independence from Indonesia and establishment as Timor Leste.
Sabam said the book was part of the effort to give a complete account of Timor Leste, with a vivid description of how the Foreign Ministry and then foreign minister were bypassed by Habibie and his advisers on the East Timor referendum.
Despite Alatas' assertion that the book was not intended to refute misrepresentations about Timor Leste in many previous books, he wrote in the foreword: " ... Here and there in my reading (of many other books) I have come across a few versions and details that do not correspond to what I believe actually transpired."
With almost all of the other East Timor works authored by foreign observers, Alatas believed it was time for a book based on the perspective of an Indonesian citizen intimately involved in the Timor Leste question for all of the 25 years of his experience.
Alatas said the Indonesian public needed to know what happened during Indonesia's struggle to retain Timor Leste, especially the closed-door negotiations from 1983 to 1999, to avoid false myths and accusations that it was a struggle between good -- meaning East Timor -- on the one side, and bad -- Indonesia -- on the other.
"It is to be hoped that valuable lesson will be learned and to be used to develop our nation," he told the audience.
Alatas underlined that the most important aspect that Indonesian political leaders can learn from Timor Leste for the future was how to treat areas vulnerable to secession, such as Papua and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.
He also said the case of Timor Leste showed that Indonesia should never underestimate the power of non-governmental organizations when they united behind a particular cause. They could influence their respective governments, he added, and had showed that Timor Leste was not "a mere pebble anymore but became something that burdened Indonesia".
Presidential spokesman Dino Patti Djalal, who was also an Alatas aide for Timor Leste, said the book taught many valuable lessons.
This included, he added, that Indonesia failed to win the hearts and minds of the Timor Leste people by simply pouring money into the province, and letting the military and intelligence play a greater role in the area.
Indonesia occupied the former Portuguese colony in 1975. In a UN-sponsored referendum in 1999, the people overwhelmingly voted for separation from Indonesia. In May 2002, it became an independent state.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 17:56
Australian government ignores growing social disaster in East Timor
By Peter Symonds
10 August 2006
The events of the last month have confirmed that the Australian military intervention in East Timor was never motivated by the slightest concern for the East Timorese people. Having put troops on the ground, ousted Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and installed Jose Ramos-Horta in his place, the Howard government has achieved its immediate objectives and moved on to next business.
However, the social crisis confronting the population of the tiny impoverished state remains. According to UN Humanitarian Coordinator Finn Reske-Nielsen, an estimated 150,000 people are still displaced after fleeing violence stirred up since April by opponents of Alkatiri’s Fretilin government. Some 72,000 people are still receiving food aid in Dili and another 80,000 people are displaced outside the capital.
Most refugees are living in squalid conditions in makeshift camps, too scared to return home. Reske-Nielsen told AFP that many feel the fundamental issues are unresolved, saying: “The political issues are still there, there are still a number of weapons out in the population, the people who committed crimes during the crisis have not been prosecuted—those are some of the factors, but on top of that the situation is still somewhat volatile.”
Some 17,000 refugees are crammed into a convent in Balide on the outskirts of Dili, with 2,000 living under nothing more than tarpaulins. The remainder shelter in aid agency tents or inside the convent buildings. According to the camp director, four children and one adult have died of preventable diseases since May. “I and my family still want to stay here because there is no security guarantee for us,” Paolo Soares, whose youngest daughter died of diarrhoea, told AFP.
Ramos-Horta has declared that his top priority to get people to return to their homes but with gangs still roaming the streets they have refused to do so. Last weekend between 300 to 400 youth armed with crude weapons, including slingshots and rocks, were involved in a series of violent incidents. Australian-led troops and police arrested around 40 over three days. In one instance, young gang members forced their way into a church and screamed “kill all easterners”. In another case, 19 men were arrested as they allegedly planned to attack one of Dili’s refugee camps.
In May, such incidents were splashed over the front pages of every Australian newspaper as Canberra sought to establish a pretext and the political climate at home for its military intervention in East Timor. Having achieved its political ends, the Howard government is now silent on the continuing social catastrophe in East Timor and the media barely reported last weekend’s violence. The Australian military has begun withdrawing some of its troops, making clear that the clashes in Dili were never the real reason for their presence.
In fact, Canberra’s barely disguised aims of ousting Alkatiri only encouraged Fretilin’s political opponents to deliberately stir up so-called ethnic tensions between “westerners” and “easterners”. The violent attacks on “easterners” were above all against Fretilin and its supporters, which, during its long struggle against Indonesian repression, were based in the mountainous east. A WSWS correspondent from East Timor noted recently: “If you were a resident in Dili you would have noticed that the houses that were burned down were predominantly the homes of Fretilin supporters and militants.”
Behind many of the youth gangs in Dili are anti-Fretilin figures—politicians, businessmen and military “rebels”. Following an attack on a UNICEF aid worker in a refugee camp, the UN body issued a statement condemning the “manipulation of children to commit these violent acts”. It expressed “great concern” over “the abuse of children in political protests, in destruction of properties and in wielding weapons to inflict harm on others.”
An article in the Sydney Morning Herald indicated that supporters of rebel officer Alfredo Reinado were involved in last weekend’s violence. Prior to Alkatiri’s resignation on June 26, Reinado featured prominently in the Australian media as a spokesman for rebel soldiers and police and was treated with kid gloves by the Australian military. He openly supported the Australian intervention and clashes between his soldiers and those loyal to the Fretilin government provided the immediate excuse for Canberra to dispatch troops in late May.
Reinado was arrested on July 27 after the discovery of an arms cache following the expiry of an amnesty to turn in illegal weapons. Portuguese police found the firearms in houses being illegally occupied by Reinado’s men across the street from Australian military headquarters in Dili. He has since been charged with a number of offences, including attempted murder, embezzlement and theft. His arrest sparked protests by gangs of youth, 12 of whom were arrested for stoning a refugee camp in Dili.
The Australian press has all but ignored Reinado’s arrest, no doubt preferring to forget its promotion of him as a legitimate opponent of the Alkatiri government. The fact that Reinado was ensconced in houses near Australian military headquarters only raises more questions about his relations with Australian authorities prior to, during and immediately after the intervention. Reinado spent part of his exile in Australia before returning to East Timor after the independence referendum in 1999 and last year trained at the Australian defence academy in Canberra.
The chief priorities of the Howard government remain what they have been all along: to establish a strong military and political presence in Dili and to ensure that Australia retains the lion’s share of the benefits from oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea. Nothing is being done to alleviate the appalling poverty afflicting the majority of East Timorese, now exacerbated by the displacement of almost a fifth of the country’s population.
Reflecting his allegiance to Canberra, Ramos-Horta declared, before assuming office on July 10, that Australia should lead any new UN mission to East Timor. Immediately after his installation, he announced that one of his top priorities would be to ensure that the East Timorese parliament ratified an agreement signed in January between the two countries over the division of Greater Sunrise, by far the largest of the Timor Sea oil and gas fields. It was Alkatiri’s refusal to buckle to Canberra’s bullying in negotiations, as well as his turn to other countries—including China and Australia’s rival for influence, Portugal—that prompted the Howard government to move against him.
A month later, Ramos-Horta has still not presented the agreement to the parliament, reflecting continued opposition, not only among MPs but the broader population, to the Australian government’s seizure of resources that, under international law, should belong to East Timor. In Kuala Lumpur late last month for a meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), he renewed his pledge to submit the treaty quickly and assured Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer that he was confident it would pass. To date, he has not done so.
Ramos-Horta’s cabinet is anxious to attract foreign investors. An article last month in the Australian Financial Review entitled “Timor back in business” reported that a team of executives from the Australian resources giant Santos met with the prime minister just days after he was sworn in. The company has signed a major deal with Dili to explore the Jahal Kuda Tasi oilfield in the Timor Sea. Timorese authorities are expected to shortly announce the winners of new offshore oil and gas exploration rights.
Natural Resources Minister Jose Teixeira told the Australian Financial Review: “Our message to foreign investors is, check with those doing business in Timor. The troubles were localised to Dili. It’s well known that not one foreign business was touched.” These comments from Teixeira, known as a supporter of Alkatiri, are designed to assure investors that Fretilin, which retains a parliamentary majority and a strong cabinet presence, will not obstruct the exploitation of East Timor’s resources.
The Howard government is determined to maintain a government in Dili that is sympathetic to Australian economic and strategic interests. Canberra is pushing for a prominent role in a new UN mission in East Timor, due to be announced later this month. Under the current Australian-led occupation, efforts are continuing to prosecute Alkatiri and former interior minister Rogerio Lobato on trumped-up charges of arming hit squads to intimidate and murder political opponents.
Alkatiri appeared for questioning at the prosecutor-general’s office last month but is yet to be charged. According to an article in the Sydney Morning Herald on July 26, Lobato has retracted admissions that he provided arms to Vincente “Railos” da Conceicao, alleging that Australian soldiers coerced him into making false declarations in court. The hit squad claims, which were the subject of a lurid expose by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s “Four Corners” program, are based on the dubious statements of Railos and his supporters, who are openly hostile to Alkatiri and Lobato.
The political situation in Dili remains highly volatile. While Ramos-Horta has been installed, his cabinet is yet to implement any major policy, including the government budget and the oil and gas treaty with Australia. President Xanana Gusmao, who, along with Ramos-Horta, led the campaign to oust Alkatiri, retains significant powers under a state of emergency that has been extended to the end of August by the unelected Council of State. In these conditions, the Howard government is intent on maintaining a military and police force in East Timor to guarantee the interests of Australian imperialism.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 17:54
This report is based on information received from the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), UN Agencies, international NGOs and media sources.
1. East Timor's Council of State agreed on 31 July to a second 30-day extension of the "state of emergency" first declared by President Xanana Gusmão on May 30 to address the country's spiral of violence.
2. There has been resurgence in violent activity in Dili over the reporting week. The return of youths from the East of the country to Dili might have acted as an immediate catalyst for trouble with westerners. Tension is also fuelled by deep resentments regarding the continued imprisonment of Maj Alfredo, the leader of the ‘Petitioners’ exacerbated by rumour and insinuations. The UN remains at security Phase III.
3. IDPs in camps are targeted by the recent violence with groups of youths throwing stones at IDPs or threatening them with knifes, machetes or sling shots. Increased police patrols have made over 90 arrests over the last weekend alone but security has not been fully restored. Some of the youth seek refuge in IDP camps to attack people passing by the camps.
4. The International Police forces have commenced 24-hour Police response patrols and operations within Dili, with the Portuguese Military Police (GNR) rapid reaction response and also Joint Task Force (JTF) back up available. There are currently over 500 International Police in Dili. The police report that they are carrying out numerous arrests and that the troublemakers have an increasing readiness to confront the international police and are less and less afraid. There are fears that the violence might continue at this level in peaks and troughs. Aid workers working in camps have not been targeted so far.
5. It is estimated that about 72,000 people are receiving food aid in Dili camps as of early August. It is not clear how many IDPs are still in the districts with host families or in camps outside of Dili, including in Baucau. There are many reasons why IDPs have not yet voluntarily returned home. The principal one is that the IDPs do not believe that the root causes of the conflict including land and property disputes, have been resolved. Furthermore, damage to the residential areas, continuing East/West divide, and rumours of illegal weapons still unaccounted for adds to the sense of insecurity. Therefore only few have returned to Dili from the districts, leaving part of the family (women/children), behind while others overnight in IDP camps while accessing their day jobs in Dili. Other families are awaiting more favourable conditions before they return, postponing their movement even until after the elections, scheduled for May 2007.
6. The aid community is concerned that the government might expedite the return of IDPs to their areas of origin or might wish to empty some camps from where youth groups are creating disturbances; the Humanitarian Coordinator is strongly engaging with the Prime Minister and the police force to ensure that the principle of voluntary return is adhered to and that viable solutions are proposed to IDPs before they move out of camps.
7. On 4 August, Australia announced reduction of their troop strength in Timor-Leste, which will not affect the military capability to respond to police calls for assistance. Similarly, Malaysia is planning to pull out most of its 200 troops by the end of the month.
8. On 2 August, President Gusmão held a meeting with 18 NGOs. The group discussed how to bring together youths from east and west to assist in reintegrating IDPs and creating dialogue across the country.
9. Three camps in Dili have been assessed as having very poor drainage and sanitation and it would be extremely difficult to bring them up to SPHERE standards before the rainy season. The Ministry of Labour assisted by agencies is looking at proposing to the IDPs sheltered in those camps three options: return home, relocation to other camps or setting up of an emergency camp.
10. UNICEF together with Concern, CRS, Plan, and local NGOs recently concluded a rapid assessment of the water and sanitation situation in the districts hosting the IDPs. The survey recommended immediate distribution of water/sanitation and hygiene kits and jerry cans, regular water quality monitoring, hygiene education and latrine construction works. As a follow up, the government’s water and sanitation services were assisted in delivering water to Baucau District, sheltering more than 25,000 displaced people. In addition, 5,000 hygiene kits will be distributed to the districts in the near future.
11. The ICRC and Timor-Leste Red Cross Society (CVTL) are helping families in the capital and districts of Timor-Leste to locate their family members they lost contact with because of the recent events. Notices have been posted in camps, churches, and other sites where displaced families are staying, to make them aware of the available Red Cross tracing service. 94 inquiries related to the unrest have been collected since April 28, 2006: 33 of them have been resolved to date and efforts to solve the other cases are being pursued.
12. As the political instability contiues, aid agencies fear that malnutrition might increase, affecting even more children. Before this year’s crisis, Timor-Leste was already the most undernourished country in the Asia-Pacific region: Almost half of the children below age of five were underweight, with 15 per cent severely underweight. In order to identify children who are malnourished in the current emergency, the nutritional assessment of children under 5 years of age was conducted by UNICEF in 52 camps in Dili district. This assessment found that 122 were moderately malnourished and seven were severely malnourished. Malnutrition was most common in the 6-18 month age group, with children in this age bracket accounting for 65 per cent of all cases. UNICEF is now distributing WFP corn-soya blend (CSB) and oil and sugar rations for supplementary feeding of malnourished children identified in the screening. Basic nutrition education and cooking demonstrations using the CSB are being conducted in the camps.
13. CARE International in Timor Leste conducted Gender Awareness Training for Camp Managers and volunteers in 24 Dili IDP camps. The purpose of this training was to introduce a set of tools developed to support Camp Management in understanding the gender dimensions of their work in IDP camps and foster greater participation of IDP women and men in all aspects of camp management through decision-making and direct involvement. Follow up activities will include working with Camp Managers in the establishment of participatory consultation mechanisms in the 15 IDP camps where CARE is working directly as SLS, and the dissemination of the findings to all Agencies and Organizations involved in the humanitarian response.
14. The government has indicated its commitment to support reconstruction of around 1,000 houses and buildings completely or partially destroyed in Dili and the districts during the April-May incidents. UNDP through its project ‘Urgent Damage Assessment and Recovery Planning’ will provide technical support to the government to carry out a reliable and unbiased assessment of the destruction and to develop a detailed plan for quick recovery activities. On the basis of the assessment, the project will identify the most affected population and communities requiring priority assistance, conduct a conflict resolution needs assessment and identify appropriate sites for the reconstruction of houses and buildings as well as relocation of the affected part of the population not willing to return to their old neighbourhoods. Assistance to the government will also be provided for development of a comprehensive recovery plan.
16. In a media statement released on 28 July, UNICEF strongly condemned the manipulation of children after some of them were seen holding banners in the front line of a demonstration outside Dili Police station. UNICEF called upon leaders of the nation and also parents and the community to take immediate actions to stop the alleged exploitation of children.
17. As a follow up of the interagency Rapid-Joint Assessment in the districts, District-based Emergency Food Security Assessment will be conducted by agencies working on food security during 8 August -- 18 September to identify the key risks faced by households vulnerable to food insecurity as a result of this crisis, taking into account the underlying baseline of food insecurity and poverty. This will provide further information on food security programs and policy choices. It also contributes to the understanding of people’s current vulnerability status and how this may change in response to various crises for contingency planning. The survey aims to cover 1,380 completely randomly selected households in 12 districts.
18. The Government of Norway has announced on 31 July a USD 1 million contribution to the UNDP supported ‘Justice System Programme’ for the period 2006-2009. The USD 10 million project aims to increase institutional capacities in the governmental, judicial and prosecution branches of the justice sector.
OCHA is in close contact with the UN Country Team and UNOTIL in Dili and will revert with further information as it becomes available. This situation report, together with further information on ongoing emergencies, is also available on the OCHA Internet Website at http://www.reliefweb.int.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 17:51
Lisboa, 09 Ago (Lusa) - O primeiro-ministro timorense, José Ramos-Horta, visitou hoje o quartel-general da GNR em Díli e elogiou o comportamento dos militares portugueses para garantir a segurança, informou o Governo de Timor-Leste em comunicado.
"Os militares portugueses, como os das restantes forças internacionais, estão a ter um papel decisivo na reposição da ordem e da segurança", afirmou Ramos-Horta no final de uma visita às instalações.
"A GNR é uma força policial de intervenção, só actuando nos casos em que as outras polícias regulares não conseguem por si só controlar a situação. Não está ao serviço de alguém em particular, está ao serviço do povo timorense", disse ainda o primeiro-ministro timorense.
Aproveitando para agradecer "a pronta resposta de Portugal num momento difícil para Timor-Leste", Ramos-Horta sublinhou que "os polícias e militares estão a actuar" no país "a pedido expresso do Presidente da República, do presidente do Parlamento nacional e do Governo, e actuam sob indicações expressas do Chefe de Estado e de mim próprio".
Acompanhado pelos ministros da Administração Estatal, Ana Pessoa, do Interior, Alcino Baris, e do Trabalho e Reinserção Comunitária, Arsénio Bano, o primeiro-ministro foi recebido pelo comandante do sub-agrupamento Bravo, capitão Gonçalo Carvalho, e por 50 dos 127 militares da GNR que compõem o sub-agrupamento Bravo.
Também estavam presentes na visita às antigas instalações do Centro de Estudos Aduaneiros, que serve de quartel-general à força portuguesa, os três elementos do Instituto Nacional de Emergência Médica português.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 09:49
The Guardian 9 August, 2006
Timor Leste: present problems; future strategies
For those who have supported the independence of Timor Leste (TL) for over 30 years, Timorese and others, the events occurring there over the past few months are heartbreaking. Many world leaders are describing TL as a failed state — this is particularly so of Australia’s political leaders who have worked tirelessly to push for the removal of former TL Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri.
Much of the media analysis about events in TL have centred around the performance and personality of Alkatiri. In my view this is very naïve and it has overshadowed attempts to highlight the many other contributing factors that led to the crisis.
It has to be admitted that TL’s leaders have made some mistakes. Probably, the worst one was to sack almost 600 members of the FDTL (TL’s defence force) following protests over conditions in March 2006.This led to divisions that could have been avoided if there had been some attempt to address the grievances more sympathetically. One FALANTIL (National Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor) I know personally complained to me that Alkatiri did not listen to the concerns of the veterans and did not treat them with respect.
Many of the problems within PNTL (TL’s police force) have been laid at the feet of the disgraced former Interior Minister, Rogerio Lobato, who has been accused of training its members to be an opposing force to the FDTL.
It has to be said that Australia’s politicians have contributed largely to the problems being faced in TL. For the 24 years of the Indonesian military (TNI) occupation, Australia gave military and diplomatic support to Indonesia.
In 1999, when the UN was planning for TL’s independence referendum, it was Australian leaders who insisted that UN peacekeepers were not needed and that a policing operation would provide sufficient security. The result was that TL gained its independence, but saw the deaths of a further 2000 of its citizens and the destruction of 80 percent of its infrastructure.
TL, the poorest nation in SE Asia, has the lowest per capita GDP in the world ($400 pa) with over 40 percent of its population living below the poverty line of 55 US cents per day.
Eighty percent of the population is under 18 years of age and unemployment exceeds 50 percent. In addition, the British Medical Journal Lancet, which carried out a study of mental health needs in TL identified that significant numbers of people have post traumatic stress disorder and other psychological problems because they witnessed the torture, rape or murder of relatives or friends.
In addition to the actions taken by rebel members of the PNTL and the FDTL, little mention has been made in the main stream media of former militia groups and millenarian groups (eg Colimau 2000) that have contributed to much of the opportunistic violence.
Despite the criticisms of him, it must be acknowledged that Alkatiri has actually played a vital role in TL’s leadership. He was one of the main architect’s of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). The reason he is disliked by Australian political leaders is that he stood up to their bullying over the Timor Sea oil and gas negotiations. He has played a major role in keeping the TL economy out of the hands of the World Bank and the IMF. It will be interesting to see if interim PM Jose Ramos Horta will be as successful in this regard.
Alkatiri is responsible for bringing Cuban doctors to TL to work in rural areas and established a new medical school at the national university. He is known to have concerns about environmental and women’s issues and is an opponent of the privatisation of TL’s electricity.
If it is proven that he was responsible for arming unofficial militias, obviously this is a serious matter. However, in most democracies, he would have been asked to stand aside — not resign — until the allegations had been disproved. I think Xanana’s decision to force him to resign was wrong and unwise. It will further antagonise the hard-liners in FRETILIN who have been critical of him.
With all of these problems, what steps need to be taken return TL to effective development and rebuilding TL?
The following actions need to be taken to assist TL to protect its security:
UN peacekeepers need to remain in TL for some years to come
TL certainly needs more assistance with the recruiting and training of its police force
international peacekeepers and police will need to have a continuing presence in the border region until the TL border police and FDTL are able to effectively stop incursions by the TNI, its militias and its black marketeers
the UN needs to pressure the Indonesian Government to ensure that all militia groups trained by the TNI on the TL/West Timor border are disbanded and remove the present TNI divisions away from the border
the UN must insist that all member nations cease all forms of military cooperation with the TNI until all the war criminals in its ranks have been brought to justice
the UN needs to establish an international war crimes tribunal to try the scores of war criminals in the ranks of the TNI and its militias
this tribunal will need to have powers of extradition and UN member
nations will have to be prevailed upon to cooperate with the tribunal
and extradite any alleged TNI criminals who are found within their borders
The Australian Government needs to be pressured by the UN and the world community to:
sign the International Law of the Sea
hand over all the oil/gas profits it has taken from TL’s half of the Timor Sea since drilling began
The Indonesian Government be compelled to pay reparations for all the destruction that it has been caused by its military in TL.
The UN should provide interest-free loans and grants to:
fund urgently needed humanitarian programs
establish industries and job creation schemes
rebuild the rice growing industry
Training and administration
It will be necessary for the UN with support from friendly nations to stay longer in TL to provide administrative support and training to the new nation.
The UN is presently committed to remain for another two years. PM Ramos Horta believes that a 10-year commitment is necessary.
Respect for TL’s sovereignty
There has been much debate about the motives of Australia in wanting to send its soldiers before being asked by TL’s political leaders. There has to be some international agreement between all nations dealing with TL to respect its sovereignty on both land and sea and not to seek to profit unfairly from this nation at this early and very precarious stage of its rebuilding and development.
I believe that if the above strategies are undertaken, TL will be able to overcome its many problems and build a more successful future for its long suffering and courageous citizens.
*Andy Alcock is the Information Officer
of the Australia East Timor Friendship Association (South Australia Inc) Inc
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 09:46
Portugis is the indonesian way of saying Portuguese.
Portuguese language was chosen by the leadership od Timor-Leste because it is a language that will allow us timoreese to evolve in a modern world without assassinating our national languages.
As you should know, countries that have adopted english as official language, have slowly wittnessed the killing of their ancestral languages, culture and traditions.
If Timor-Leste had adopted english as an official language, in 50 years time, the music, literature and traditions of Timor-Leste would be no different than those of the Northern territory of Austrália. Timor-Leste would then have lost its own identity. The same thing applies if Bahasa indonesian was adopted as a national language.
On the other hand, Portugal is so far away and is integrated in the European Community, that our leaders understood, there was no risk of being colonized. You should also aknowledge that the behavior of Portugal towards Timor-Leste is in no way related to that of a colonizing power. On the contrary. Your statement could be understood as offensive by the portuguese people that spend so much money of their taxes to help Timor-Leste.
Many timoreese don´t speak portuguese for several reasons:
1. In XVIII century, the Jesuit priests that had setup many schools in Timor were sent away by the King of Portugal. So for many years there were no schools in Timor. Even in Portugal almost all schools were from the church at that time.
2. As a small and poor country, Portugal didn't have the resources to setup schools everywhere. Only in 1970s the school system in Timor started to reach out to the sub distrits.
3. The indonesian invaders prohibited the speaking od portuguese, apreended all books and music records they could find in portuguese to produce accelerated assimilation from the population. then they sent in thousands of teachers from Java and other islands to make us speak bahasa indonesian.
If you are a supporter of a independent timo-Leste, you must insist on speaking tétum and portuguese. That way we will ensure that in the future, we remain a different people from our neighbours. Not assimilated by them.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 09:39
Stephen Fitzpatrick, Jakarta correspondent
ONE of Indonesia's most senior officials has admitted that his country was directly responsible for failing to stop the murderous chaos that accompanied its withdrawal from East Timor in 1998.
Dino Patti Djalal, a senior Foreign Ministry staffer at the time, said the withdrawal was conducted in an "irrational" manner and that Jakarta never displayed the "heart and will to rein in" Indonesian-backed militia groups who slaughtered thousands after East Timor's independence referendum in 1999.
Speaking at the launch of an analysis of the period by former foreign minister Ali Alatas, Mr Djalal - now President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's official spokesman - made an impassioned plea for Indonesia to learn from its mistakes in East Timor.
He said that if those lessons were not learned "by political officials and security officials, it will not be possible to solve the problems of Aceh, Poso and Papua" - all regions that have experienced extreme ethnic and nationalist revolt. Aceh has recently come under a new autonomy law after a decades-long independence struggle.
Launching his book, The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor, Mr Alatas claimed that the Suharto regime's 24-year occupation of the tiny country had been more benign than was generally recognised and that it was Suharto's erratic successor, BJ Habibie, who was responsible for the poor decisions.
Speaking from the floor during a question-and-answer session afterwards, Mr Djalal went further, saying Indonesia had misruled East Timor but laying the blame for the chaos that accompanied its withdrawal squarely at Dr Habibie's feet.
Dr Habibie, who had replaced the dictator Suharto in 1998, responded petulantly to a letter from John Howard at the end of the same year suggesting an autonomy option for East Timor. His offer of a referendum proposing independence or integration with Indonesia was made in haste and without regard to "the situation on the ground", Mr Djalal said.
"When you sent me to East Timor to assess the situation (in 1999), it was clear that the people were not ready there, they did not know the concept (of independence)," Mr Djalal told his former boss, Mr Alatas.
"I have spent many sleepless nights thinking about this because we put a timetable straitjacket on the referendum and all because BJ Habibie wanted to take the result to the MPR (Indonesia's upper house of parliament). It was not rational.
"We thought we could just splash lots of money about and that would signify something. We were wrong. East Timor became a police state, we were bribing people we thought were loyal to us, and doing horrible things to people we thought were not loyal to us."
Dr Habibie's eccentric and unpredictable rule has been criticised from outside Indonesia but last night's statements were among the strongest to have been made at official levels in Jakarta.
Mr Djalal's assessment was backed last night by a one-time senior Suharto administration figure, former industry minister Hartato, who said from the floor that the occupation of East Timor was "still an extremely important problem for Indonesia" and that it "must become an issue of extreme introspection for us -- I very much agree with what the young man has said".
Mr Alatas responded to Mr Djalal's comments by agreeing that Indonesia must learn from its East Timor mistakes and be careful "not to disregard our problems in the regions, such as in Aceh and Papua".
Former ambassador to Australia Sabam Siagian, unlike Mr Djalal an official speaker at last night's launch, warned that there was still an overwhelmingly Java-centric approach to the way Indonesia's outer islands were administered, something that had contributed to the disaster of East Timor and could continue to create problems.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 09:36
Tradução da Margarida:
Quarta-feira • Agosto 9, 2006
O Parlamento de Timor-Leste aprovou o Orçamento do ano fiscal 2006-7, o maior de sempre da jovem nação, de 315 milhões de dólares, depois de um atraso causado pela violência e levantamento político em Maio.
O ano fiscal de Timor-Leste começou em 1 de Julho, dias depois da saída de Mari Alkatiri do posto de primeiro-ministro na vigília do desassossego mortal despoletado pela demissão de cerca de 600 soldados que desertaram queixando-se de discriminação.
O laureado do Nobel da paz José Ramos-Horta foi nomeado para o substituir no mês passado e lidera um governo que governará até às eleições em Maio do próximo ano.
Ramos-Horta já apresentou o programa do governo no parlamento, que foca na estimulação da economia da mais pobre nação Asiática através de projectos de infra-estruturas.
Sessenta e seis membros do parlamento de 88 lugares votaram a favor do orçamento, que é 121 por cento mais elevado do que o do ano passado. Dois votaram contra.
O governo também conta com 100 milhões de dólares providenciados por dadores internacionais, um aumento de 300 por cento sobre 2005-6.
"Com 66 votos a favor, dois contra e zero abstenções, foi um verdadeiro, bom processo e o primeiro-ministro já disse que o governo se compromete a implementar este orçamento," disse aos repórteres o Vice primeiro-ministro Rui Araújo.
Nas despesas, 122 milhões serão para bens e serviços e 120 milhões para desenvolvimento, disse uma declaração do governo.
Ramos-Horta planeia uma reunião com os responsáveis por todos os distritos e sub-distritos no fim de Agosto para discutir o lançamento rápido da economia.
A economia de Timor-Leste subiu 2.3 por cento no ano passado, de uns 0.4 por cento em 2004. Cerca de 40 por cento da população vive abaixo da linha de pobreza de 55 cêntimos por dia, de acordo com os números das Nações Unidas.
Apesar dos milhões de dólares esperados das suas ricas reservas de petróleo e gás nos próximas anos, a ONU tem avisado que esse rendimento é incerto e que o país continua a necessitar de apoio financeiro de dadores.
A violência de Maio deixou pelo menos 21 pessoas mortas e forçou 150,000 a fugir das suas casas. Os deslocados mantêm-se nos campos, demasiado assustados para regressarem a casa apesar da presença de algumas 3,000 tropas internacionais na nação.
Foi o pior desassossego a atingir Timor-Leste desde que ganhou a independência em 2002, depois de um voto em 1999 de ruptura com a vizinha Indonésia que o governou durante 24 anos. — AFP
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 09:34
Washington, 09 Ago (Lusa) - O Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas reúne-se quinta-feira para efectuar "consultas" sobre a situação em Timor-Leste e analisar propostas para uma nova e reforçada missão da ONU, disseram hoje fontes na ONU.
O mandato da actual missão da ONU em Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) termina a 20 de Agosto próximo.
O aspecto militar e policial da nova missão deverá ser o principal tópico em discussão, disseram as fontes.
A oposição de alguns dos membros do Conselho de Segurança deverá retirar à nova missão a componente militar como inicialmente desejado pelo governo timorense.
O primeiro-ministro de Timor-Leste, José Ramos Horta, afirmou terça-feira que uma força policial de 1.600 membros será enviada para o país, ao abrigo da nova missão, confirmando assim o compromisso de se enviar uma força policial "robusta" para o território mas não uma força militar.
Na reunião, o Conselho de Segurança deverá também começar a analisar um relatório do Secretário-geral, Kofi Annan, que contém propostas para uma nova missão da ONU e cujos pormenores ainda não foram divulgados.
Fontes na ONU disseram que sendo a reunião de quinta-feira apenas de "consultas" não se deve esperar qualquer decisão sobre o assunto.
Na próxima semana, o Conselho de Segurança tem agendado mais duas reuniões sobre Timor-Leste: a primeira para um debate geral sobre a situação e a segunda para aprovação de uma resolução.
É provável que um novo mandato venha também a incluir as recomendações feitas na semana passada por Annan para o estabelecimento de um programa internacional de ajuda às vítimas de crimes de guerra cometidos em 1999 em Timor-Leste.
Annan propôs no relatório o estabelecimento de "fundo de solidariedade" baseado em contribuições voluntárias de Estados membros "para financiar um programa de restauração comunitária e um programa de justiça em Timor-Leste".
O Secretário-geral da ONU propôs ainda um outro "programa de restauração comunitária" para "apoiar os timorenses e em parceria com organizações da sociedade civil" fornecer diversos tipos de ajuda às vítimas dos crimes cometidos em 1999.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 09:28
GNR will stay in TL + Only President Xanana can stop GNR mission in TL
In response to the statement of the National Front for Justice and Peace (NFJP) which had asked GNR to stop their mission in Timor-Leste, Minister of Interior Alcino Barris said that the GNR will stay in Timor-Leste to maintain security and protect Timorese people. “All international troops are here to protect us and paid by their own governments so don’t create rumours that the GNR and Australian troops are not showing impartiality” said Barris.
MP from PD party, Rui Menezes told the media that only President Xanana can bring an end to the GNR mission in Timor-Leste. Regarding NFJP’s demands, Menezes said that Timor-Leste is a free and democratic country so people have the right to express their feelings but that does not mean they can act on everything they want MP from PD party, Rui Menezes told the media that only President Xanana can bring an end to the GNR mission in Timor-Leste. (DN, STL)
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 09:23
Obrigado pela solidariedade, Margarida!
Mensagem inicial - 16 de Maio de 2006
"Apesar de frágil, Timor-Leste é uma jovem democracia em que acreditamos. É o país que escolhemos para viver e trabalhar. Desde dia 28 de Abril muito se tem dito sobre a situação em Timor-Leste. Boatos, rumores, alertas, declarações de países estrangeiros, inocentes ou não, têm servido para transmitir um clima de conflito e insegurança que não corresponde ao que vivemos. Vamos tentar transmitir o que se passa aqui. Não o que ouvimos dizer... "