Sismo de intensidade 7,1 em Samatra há poucos momentos.
quarta-feira, outubro 24, 2007
H. Correia deixou um novo comentário na sua mensagem "Dos Leitores":
Agradeço a disponibilidade do Sr. coronel em vir esclarecer as dúvidas que pairavam no ar.
Não posso deixar de enaltecer a coragem e capacidade de iniciativa que ele e os seus colegas demonstraram nesse dia, tentando resolver uma situação muito delicada. Com efeito, havia que agir rapidamente e isso evitou decerto um massacre ainda maior.
Infelizmente, o Homem nem sempre consegue moldar o Destino. Há outros factores que influenciam o curso dos acontecimentos, e assim nem sempre o resultado é o esperado.
Claro que depois de as coisas acontecerem é fácil vir dizer que devia ter sido assim ou assado. Como os treinadores de bancada que, uma vez terminado o jogo, são peremptórios em afirmar que devia ter jogado fulano em vez de sicrano e assim talvez a equipa não perdesse.
É claro como água que nunca oficiais tão responsáveis e experientes iriam sair com os PNTL desarmados, sem haver previamente concordância e aprovação de TMR. E a prova que houve é o cessar-fogo que momentos antes este tinha ordenado. E que foi cumprido.
Acho que ficou também claro que, apesar da aparente violação das FDTL ao cessar-fogo, o tiroteio foi o resultado da inciativa individual de 3 ou 4 elementos desta força que, por ajuste de contas pessoais ou outros motivos que só eles poderão esclarecer, decidiram abrir fogo selectivamente, visando certos elementos da PNTL. Estes criminosos desobedeceram inequivocamente às ordens superiores.
Se TMR não está a ser fiel aos acontecimentos, caberá ao tribunal apurar a verdade e confrontá-lo com as eventuais contradições.
Mas o que me parece fundamental é que os perpretadores do massacre, ou quase todos, estão identificados e devem ser exemplarmente punidos.
E que jamais se repita uma tragédia como esta.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 23:48
"UNMIT assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of the articles or for the accuracy of their translations. The selection of the articles and their content do not indicate support or endorsement by UNMIT express or implied whatsoever. UNMIT shall not be responsible for any consequence resulting from the publication of, or from the reliance on, such articles and translations."
National Media Reports
Nuno Anaia’s testimony: PNTL disarmament had accord with Taur Matan Ruak
UNPol officer, Nuno Pasqual Anaia testified in the Dili District Court on Tuesday (23/10) that there was an accord between the Commander of the F-FDTL, Taur Matan Ruak, and UN Commander Reis and David Mann to disarm the PNTL officers.
“I know that Commander Reis made an accord Commander Taur Matan Ruak at the F-FDTL Headquarters to disarm the PNTL before walking to Obrigado Barracks. The information was provided through radio by Reis,” testified Anaia.
However, Commander Taur Matan Ruak told the Court on Tuesday (16/10) that he never made any accord with the UN Commander to disarm the PNTL.
“The UN representative explained to me that PNTL would surrender and wanted to evacuate to Obrigado Barracks. I replied that we didn’t need any more shootings or to attack F-FDTL headquarters. We ommanded the F-FDTL to stop shooting, and it stopped,” said Taur Matan Ruak. (STL and DN)
National Parliament recommends investigating Longuinhos
The National Parliament has recommended that the General Prosecutor, Longuinhos Monteiro be investigated in relation to an alleged political conversation with the former national parliament member Leandro Isaac.
MPs from CNRT, Fretilin and the Democratic Party (PD) agreed that the conversation impacts upon Longuinhos’ judicial indepdence.
“We need to pay attention to this case as Mr Longuinhos may or may not have had the conversation so we need to investigate,” said Cecilio Caminha from the CNRT.
“We feel sad that this issue is now before the National Parliament. We ask the Court to investigate the case thoroughly,” said Arsenio Bano from Fretilin.
However Aderito Hugo a CNRT parliamentarian said that there is not strong enough evidence to investigate Mr Longuinhos. (TP)
European Union promises support fund to Timor-Leste
The Vice Prime Minister Jose Luis Guterres attended the Pacific Islands Conference on Monday (15/10) in Tonga and said that the European Union is promising to support a development fund for Timor-Leste.
“The meeting’s objective was to discuss the tenth development fund of the European Union that will offer funding to Pacific Islands, including Timor-leste,” said Mr. Guterres.
According to Mr. Guterres, Timor-Leste will sign the accord with the European Union in November. (TP)
Ramos-Horta promising to reduce poverty
The President José Ramos-Horta has promised that through his program, named “Fight Against Poverty” poverty will be reduced in the country in the coming five or ten years.
“Fight against poverty, as a struggle for peace, has become a national campaign,” explained Ramos-Horta on his visit to the various sub-districts in Manatuto. (TP)
Duet Salsinha-Alfredo will never solve the petitioners’ case
On Tuesday (23/10) Major Tara, an officer of the F-FDTL said that as long as Salsinha is still together with Alfredo Reinado, the problem of the Petitioners will not be resolved.
“According to my point of view, Mr. Salsinha together with Alfredo Reinado will prolong the time needed to solve the case of 600 or more Petitioners,” said Major Tara.
Major Tara also said that when President José Ramos-Horta was sworn in he stated that the problem of Salsinha, the Petitioners and Alfredo Reinado is different.
He said that while Alfredo’s case should be solved through justice, that of the Petititioners should be solved through dialogue. (STL)
National parliament protesting: ISF destroyed protected zone of environment
The International Security Forces (ISF) from New Zealand are being accused of destroying the sands at Cristo Rei IN Dili, a protected zone for recreation.
“Last week, at the protected zone, THE ISF loaded the sand into their cars.
They are in this country to assist us and follow the law,” said Francisco an MP in the national parliament on Tuesday (23/10) while showing the photos of ISF taking the sand. (STL)
UNMIT – MONITORIZAÇÃO DOS MEDIA – Quarta-feira, 24 Outubro 2007
"UNMIT assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of the articles or for the accuracy of their translations. The selection of the articles and their content do not indicate support or endorsement by UNMIT express or implied whatsoever. UNMIT shall not be responsible for any consequence resulting from the publication of, or from the reliance on, such articles and translations."
National Media Reports
Testemunho de Nuno Anaia’: desarmamento da PNTL foi de acordo com Taur Matan Ruak
O official da UNPol, Nuno Pasqual Anaia testemunhou no Tribunal do Distrito de Dili District na Terça-feira (23/10) que houve um acordo entre o Comandante das F-FDTL, Taur Matan Ruak, e o Comandante da ONU Reis e David Mann para desarmar os oficiais da PNTL.
“Sei que o Comandante Reis fez um acordo com o Comandante Taur Matan Ruak no Quartel das F-FDTL para desarmar a PNTL antes de andar para Obrigado Barracks. A informação foi dada através da rádio por Reis,” testemunhou Anaia.
Contudo, o Comandante Taur Matan Ruak disse no Tribunal na Terça-feira (16/10) que nunca fez nenhum acordo com o Comandante da ONU para desarmar a PNTL.
“O representante da ONU explicou-me que a PNTL se renderia e que queria evacuar para Obrigado Barracks. Respondi que não precisávamos de mais disparos ou de atacar o quartel das F-FDTL. Ordenámos às F-FDTL para pararem os disparos e pararam,” disse Taur Matan Ruak. (STL e DN)
Parlamento Nacional recomenda que se investigue Longuinhos
O Parlamento Nacional recomendou que o Procurador-Geral, Longuinhos Monteiro seja investigado em relação com uma alegada conversa política com o antigo deputado Leandro Isaac.
Deputados do CNRT, Fretilin e do PD concordaram que a conversa tem impacto sobre a independência judicial de Longuinhos.
“Precisamos de dar atenção a este caso dado que o Sr Longuinhos pode ter ou não ter tido a conversa por isso precisamos de investigar,” disse Cecilio Caminha do CNRT.
“Estamos entristecidos por esta questão estar agora perante o Parlamento Nacional. Pedimos ao Tribunal para investigar o caso adequadamente,” disse Arsénio Bano da Fretilin.
Contudo Adérito Hugo um deputado do CNRT disse que não há evidência suficientemente forte para investigar o Sr Longuinhos. (TP)
União Europeia promete fundo de apoio para Timor-Leste
O Vice-Primeiro-Ministro José Luis Guterres atendeu na Segunda-feira a Conferência sobre as Ilhas do Pacífico (15/10) no Tonga e disse que a União Europeia prometeu apoiar um fundo de desenvolvimento para Timor-Leste.
“O objective do encontro foi discutir o 10º fundo de desenvolvimento da União Europeia que oferecerá financiamento para as Ilhas do Pacífico, incluindo Timor-Leste,” disse o Sr. Guterres.
De acordo com o Sr. Guterres, Timor-Leste assinará o acordo com a União Europeia em Novembro. (TP)
Ramos-Horta promete reduzir a pobreza
O Presidente José Ramos-Horta prometeu que através do seu programa, chamado “Luta Contra a Pobreza” a pobreza será reduzida no país nos próximos cinco ou dez anos.
“Lutar contra a pobreza como uma luta pela paz, tornou-se uma campanha nacional,” explicou Ramos-Horta na sua visita aos vários sub-distritos em Manatuto. (TP)
Dueto Salsinha-Alfredo nunca resolverão o caso dos peticionários
Na Terça-feira (23/10) o Major Tara, um oficial das F-FDTL disse que enquanto o Salsinha continuar junto com o Alfredo Reinado, o problema dos peticionários não será resolvido.
“De acordo com o meu ponto de vista, o Sr. Salsinha junto com o Alfredo Reinado prolongarão o tempo necessário para resolver o caso dos 600 ou mais peticionários,” disse o Major Tara.
O Major Tara also disse que quando o Presidente José Ramos-Horta tomou posse ele afirmou que o roblema do Salsinha, dos peticionários e de Alfredo Reinado é diferente.
Disse que enquanto o caso do Alfredo de devia resolver através da justice, que o dos peticionários se devia resolver pelo diálogo. (STL)
Parlamento Nacional protesta: A ISF destruíu zona de ambiente protegida
As Forças Internacionais de Segurança (ISF) da Nova Zelândia estão a ser acusadas de destruírem as areias do Cristo Rei em Dili, uma zona protegida de recreio.
“Na semana passada, na zona protegida, a ISF carregou os seus carros com areia.
Estão neste país para nos assistir e seguir a lei,” disse Francisco um deputado na Terça-feira (23/10) no parlamento nacional enquanto mostrava as fotos da ISF a levar a areia. (STL)
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 19:43
Diário Digital / Lusa
O incidente mais grave da crise de 2006, conforme relatado terça-feira por um oficial português em Timor-Leste, foi uma curta-metragem de grande economia de recursos: oito mortos em 40 segundos.
O comissário da PSP Nuno Anaia relatou na terça-feira ao Tribunal de Recurso, em Díli, o que viu no dia 25 de Maio de 2006, quando elementos das Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL) atiraram sobre uma coluna desarmada da Polícia Nacional (PNTL), que seguia a pé sob escolta das Nações Unidas.
O oficial da PSP, ao volante da sua viatura da Polícia das Nações Unidas (UNPol), encabeçava o lado esquerdo da coluna de 103 polícias que saíram do quartel-general da PNTL, em Caicoli.
A coluna foi atacada poucas centenas de metros mais à frente, junto ao Ministério da Justiça.
O testemunho de Nuno Anaia é um «filme» diferente dos outros ouvidos nas últimas semanas pelo colectivo de juízes presidido pelo magistrado português Ivo Rosa, no âmbito do processo em que onze militares e um inspector da PNTL são acusados de homicídio.
Juntas, as respostas do comissário Nuno Anaia formam um filme equivalente ao que seria captado, de câmara ao ombro, pelo realizador - se o realizador fosse o alvo.
«O tiroteio durou 15 a 30 segundos, no máximo, antes de eu arrancar com o meu carro, cheio de PNTL's, em direcção ao Obrigado Barracks», quartel-general da missão internacional, contou o comissário.
«Os militares dispararam 30 a 40 segundos», acrescentou Nuno Anaia.
O oficial português é o único elemento da ONU, dos 17 presentes no tiroteio de Caicoli, que ainda se encontra em serviço em Timor-Leste, onde está em missão desde Setembro de 2003.
Foi Nuno Anaia, na altura assessor do comandante-geral da PNTL, quem, «à porta do quartel-general», organizou a coluna de polícias, alinhados em 3 filas de cerca de 35 homens.
Dentro do quartel-general, os polícias tinham sido desarmados e as armas colocadas «dentro de um blindado da UNPol».
A coluna dos PNTL, enquadrada por uma dezena de viaturas internacionais, era liderada, a pé, pelo coronel Fernando Reis, assessor militar português, e por Salif Malik, actualmente na missão da ONU na Eritreia, que empunhavam uma bandeira da ONU.
O objectivo da coluna era evacuar os polícias para as Obrigado Barracks, no seguimento de um cessar-fogo obtido pelo coronel Fernando Reis com o comando das F-FDTL, presente em Caicoli, onde militares e polícias tinham trocado tiros nessa manhã.
«Havia polícias que não queriam aceitar (a evacuação) e foi-lhes dito que podiam ficar no quartel-general», sem protecção aos disparos das F-FDTL.
«Tinham receio de um ataque cá fora», recordou o comissário Nuno Anaia.
Antes de a coluna dos PNTL avançar, três batedores da UNPol «foram à frente para verificar a passagem», até junto do Ministério da Justiça, falando com cerca de seis elementos das F-FDTL armados que aí se encontravam.
«Esses militares recuaram» e, a um sinal dos batedores, a coluna dos PNTL começou a marcha.
«Seguimos um percurso que evitaria passar pelo quartel da Polícia Militar e que, nas circunstâncias da altura, parecia o melhor», explicou hoje o comissário Nuno Anaia, acrescentando que a única via alternativa estava impedida por contentores «colocados para o congresso da Fretilin».
Quando a coluna passava no cruzamento do ministério da Justiça, Nuno Anaia viu elementos das F-FDTL aproximando-se, armados, de ambos os lados da estrada, correndo «com a arma pela bandoleira».
«Os polícias, que já estavam apavorados, ficaram ainda mais em pânico», recordou Nuno Anaia.
«Tentámos acelerar a marcha e a coluna continuou a andar».
De súbito, o comissário ouviu «gritos em tétum do lado direito, que foram correspondidos do lado esquerdo».
«Vi os elementos das F-FDTL a passarem as armas por cima dos elementos das UNPol e a dispararem», disse Nuno Anaia.
Interrogado sobre o «alvo primordial» do tiroteio, o oficial declarou que, «pelo tipo de armas, o alvo eram elementos seleccionados», com «tiros selectivos».
«Se não fossem, teria havido rajadas, porque a M16 tem uma posição (de tiro) que permite isso», declarou o oficial português.
A viatura de Nuno Anaia, para onde tinham entrado e saltado elementos da PNTL («era uma 'pick-up'»), foi atingida com dois tiros.
Nuno Anaia declarou que «de certeza não houve qualquer disparo do meio da coluna dos PNTL para fora», como alegam os arguidos.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 19:22
THE PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE APPOINTS MS KIRSTY SWORD GUSMÃO AS AMBASSADOR FOR EDUCATION
24 OCTOBER, 2007
Today the Chairwoman of the Alola Foundation, Ms Kirsty Sword Gusmão, will be sworn in as Ambassador for Education of Timor-Leste by President, Dr José Ramos-Horta.
The honorary position gives recognition of Ms Sword Gusmão’s tireless dedication to the education of the men, women and children of Timor-Leste to date, whilst also formalizing a future national and international role in promoting the Government’s educational priorities.
“Education is our first priority in giving meaning to our new found freedom and is at the crux of every single development challenge facing Timor-Leste today. I desire a fully literate and multi-lingual nation, as without that we are condemned to poverty”.
Ms Kirsty Sword Gusmão graduated from the University of Melbourne with a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in 1987. She completed her Diploma of Education the following year. In addition to her native English, Ms Sword Gusmão is a fluent speaker of Bahasa Indonesia, Tetum and Portuguese.
Her passion for all spheres of education has seen Ms Sword Gusmão invest in the education of women and children through the programs of the Alola Foundation, including maternal and child health, economic empowerment and educational scholarships. As President of the Board of Trustees of the Dili Institute of Technology, she has contributed to the strengthening of the institution through the securing of resources and scholarship opportunities. She has actively raised monies and awareness internationally of the enormity of the educational challenges facing Timor-Leste. Libraries and schools bear her name from Dili to Baucau in honour of her contributions. Ms Sword Gusmão is Patron or board member of over nine other organizations dedicated to educating the people of Timor-Leste, a remarkable achievement for one woman whose most important educational quest is that of raising her three young sons, Alexandre, Kay Olok and Daniel.
In her capacity as Ambassador for Education, Ms Sword Gusmão will represent Timor-Leste at international fora where education and educational needs are the focus and facilitate dialogue between key stakeholders, including the government, Church, international and national non-government organizations. Her priority is to ensure that education remains the most important undertaking in combating poverty in her adopted homeland.
The Ambassador for Education is an honorary position and sits outside the organisational structures of the Office of the President and the Government of RDTL. The Ambassador receives no personal remuneration.
“I am humbled by this extraordinary gesture of the President of Timor-Leste and am grateful to serve the people of Timor-Leste by actively promoting the right of all to a quality, modern and relevant education”.
“I would like to dedicate this position to the mothers and fathers of Timor-Leste. Those who are responsible for guiding and supporting their children in their educational pursuits in the face of overwhelming hardships. To the teachers who remain committed to furthering their training. And to all who celebrate knowledge as the path to enlightenment”.
Further information: Jenny Coles Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Tel: +670 732 1288
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 19:21
Fernando Reis, Coronel deixou um novo comentário na sua mensagem "Oficial português difere de CEMGFA timorense sobre...":
Mas eu digo-lhe que foi assim.
O COI não diz tudo e fala em reuniões, contactos etc, que numa situação de emergência, em que é preciso actuar no imediato, e evitar mortes não fazem sentido.
Claro que a UNOTIL não estava preparada para situações destas, mas ai deviam pedir responsabilidades ao SRSG.
Sobre o que realmente aconteceu em 25 de Maio, o Brig MTR está a baralhar um pouco as coisas ou a sua memória já não é o que era, ou então não lhe interessa dizer tudo, o que me entristece.
Sabe que fui ao encontro dele, com o meu adjunto LtCol David Mann, para que cessasse o fogo sobre o comando da PNTL, dizendo que tinha informação recebida por radio na UN, que se queriam render mas não o conseguiam contactar, e que vinha da parte do SRSG e me oferecia para mediar. Disse-lhe ainda que estavam lá 5 elementos da UNPOL. Respondeu-me que acedia ao pedido de cessar fogo mas que os elementos da PNTL teriam de sair desarmados e que os que lá ficassem com armas seriam atacados. Disse-me ainda que os levasse e às armas deles para onde quisesse.Foi depois de ordenar o cessar fogo à nossa frente que seguimos de viatura para o comando da PNTLonde dialogamos com o Com Afonso.A coluna apeada, comigo à frente de bandeira da UN na mão, seguia ladeada por viaturas da UN.
O tiroteio foi iniciado por um elemento, que tinha sido mandado afastar do cruzamento do M da Justiça pelo David, que procurou na coluna um determinado elemento da PNTL e atirou sobre ele( na altura, desconfiado com a presença próxima de militares armados, tinha-me virado para trás, pelo que vi o que aconteceu). Depois foi o que se sabe.
Na verdade eu e o David, quando verificámos que estava a ser prestado socorro às vitimas,fomos atrás dos 3 elementos que à nossa vista abriram fogo e dirigimo-nos ao Brig MTR (já tinha acabado o tiroteio) que estava perplexo com o tiroteio.Demonstrei a minha mágoa , tristeza e a traição sofrida, pois o Brig MTR tinha assegurado que sairiamos em segurança. Foi ai que deu ordem para procurarem quem abriu fogo e para os trazerem à nossa presença. Vieram 3 elementos(parece que um deles era major), reconheci 2 , um deles o que tinha iniciado o tiroteio, e que assumiram ali que tinham aberto fogo sobre a coluna. O Brig MTR repreendeu-os veemente lembrando o acordo (e o facto de terem atingido pessoal desarmado) que tinha estabelecido comigo e disse-nos para os levar para a UN e fazer com eles o que quiséssemos.Achei que não havia condições para os levar para o Obrigado, onde estavam os policias atingidos mas ficou a promessa de o Brig MTR os entregar quando fosse solicitado.
Na altura pediu-nos desculpas, com sinceridade e de uma maneira que não vou aqui dizer.
Esta é a verdade.
Lembro que tivemos 2 elementos da UNPOL que seguiam comigo a pé feridos, e se mais não fomos atingidos, tantos os ricochetes, era porque aquele não era o nosso dia.....
Espero ter avivado a memória do senhor Brigadeiro.
Nota: Para a Lusa,que não reviu os apontamentos,eu não era assessor das F-FDTL, era o SMA/CMTA da UNOTIL
NOTA DE RODAPÉ:
Confirmamos a veracidade da identidade deste testemunho.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 05:26
Timor Lorosae Nação - Terça-feira, 23 de Outubro de 2007
Mauberes e Semi-Aborígenes?
Já há muito que está em marcha a cruzada contra Portugal e os portugueses destacados em Timor-Leste ao abrigo de acordos internacionais entre Estados e a ONU.
O processo de intenções começou a ser notado logo depois da independência e tem vindo a ser cada vez mais notado pela forma como se comportam certas chefias nomeadas pela ONU como Atul Kahre, ou líderes como Xanana Gusmão, Ramos Horta e outros dirigentes da actual AMP que agora governam.
Por parte do governo australiano a hipocrisia talvez ainda seja maior. Isso mesmo se percebeu em reacções e declarações do antigo ministro dos negócios estrangeiros de Portugal, Freitas do Amaral.
O comportamento das tropas australianas estacionadas em Timor-Leste após o eclodir da crise de 2006, em relação à chegada dos militares da GNR, tornou claro que a presença portuguesa não era bem quista e que somente iria atrapalhar as obscuras intenções e práticas australianas em relação à missão para que estavam destinados.
Os militares portugueses tiveram de engolir um sapo vivo logo à chegada, sendo rodeados e desarmados pelos militares australianos em completa provocação. A intenção era criar um caso que contribuísse para maior confusão e desestabilização, não tendo a ONU admoestado o comandante e o governo australianos como devia por absoluto entendimento e sintonia com os seus propósitos.
Sabe-se em Portugal que Atul Kahre diplomaticamente viu expresso exactamente esse recado – para não tomar os portugueses por parvos – e que aos olhos dos observadores internacionais ele é tido como um elemento da ONU muito próximo dos fazeres e intenções do governo australiano, de Xanana Gusmão e de Ramos Horta.
A UNMIT, Kahre, não fez por acaso cavalo de batalha sobre a rendição dos GNRs. Kahre aquilo que pretendeu foi causar impaciência e desgaste a Portugal e aos militares portugueses para agitar a situação, nada mais. Não resultou e Portugal cedeu até onde foi possível, mas fazendo valer a sua vontade, as suas directrizes.
Nestes últimos meses têm-se vindo a notar acções aparentemente avulsas que têm tido por objectivo denegrir a presença de Portugal e dos portugueses cooperantes em Timor-Leste.
Sempre que algo de negativo á apontado aos militares australianos logo agentes dos seus interesses procuram estabelecer comparações com “negativismos” práticos de portugueses.
Comparam o incomparável, mas o desgaste e cruzada está a resultar.
As intenções são claras. A Austrália quer o caminho livre para fazer aquilo que entender de Timor-Leste. É a potência da região e o xerifado dos USA, não tendo Portugal nem a Europa que se intrometer na sua área de influência e domínio.
A Europa e Portugal servem para doar bens e serviços mas está bem claro quem manda ali. Nem afectividades históricas são compreendidas por quem faz uso da frieza e provem de uma longa prole cultural com exacerbadas práticas racistas, de apartheid, chacinas, manhas e indiferenças anglófonas – repare-se na indiferença a que estão votadas as vítimas negras do Katrina ou o trato de polé prestado aos autóctones australianos, os aborígenes.
Muito antes da independência em Timor-Leste já a Austrália se precavia. Perfilando-se e formando líderes timorenses que pudesse usar quando Suharto e o seu regime caíssem. Somente a Fretilin restou para contrariar a recolonização do petro-território, desta vez por outros senhores.
Restou a Fretilin mas também essa está minada por agentes afectos à sábia e obstinada política australiana, tornando-se claro que Xanana, Horta e Guterres procuraram pretextos para inventar duas Fretilins. Uma minada e pró-australiana, Mudança, e outra de Maputo e pró-Timor-Leste, nacionalista, com pretensões de construir um país diferente e independente.
Política interna à parte, aquilo que está a parecer aos timorenses da diáspora e a muitos que se encontram no país é que Portugal e os portugueses estão a cansar-se de perceber o cinismo dos líderes timorenses, somente aspirantes ás doações até que a alma doa em Lisboa.
Enquanto que em Portugal existe o espírito de doar por estar a ajudar amigos, querendo ver resultados, querendo ver esses amigos melhor – estando longe do seu espírito “petróleos”. O contrário acontece na Austrália.
Enquanto que os portugueses nutrem pelos timorenses laços afectivos, nos australianos, a maioria, a indiferença é uma constante – mas venha de lá os hidrocarbonetos para juntar aos que já temos porque quanto mais se tem mais se quer.
Que me perdoem os minoritários cidadãos australianos-excepção, críticos dos seus próprios governos e realmente amigos de Timor e dos timorenses.
Está a ser sentido por timorenses e portugueses um afastamentos dos governos de ambos os países. É compreensivo.
Os objectivos dos dois principais personagens que actualmente detêm o Poder em Timor-Leste, Xanana e Horta, não são coincidentes com o sentir e estar do actual Estado português. É que para os portugueses primeiro estão os timorenses, o bem-estar, a evolução, a independência, o usufruto dos bens que lhes pertencem – e pertence-lhes bastante. Mas para os actuais líderes isso já é impossível por via dos compromissos encapotadamente assumidos com os governantes australianos – e isso já vem de muito longe, já está enraizado.
O golpe de estado do ano passado foi o princípio do fim da hipótese de independência que Timor-Leste teve, mas que jamais consumará.
Outros tempos virão para os timorenses, um pouco mais de uma paz podre, numa sociedade semi-aborígene, semi-timorense, em que a identidade maubere se esvairá na ilusão da obtenção de alguns bens essenciais que os novos colonizadores concederão para conter revoltas provindas das injustiças.
É aos timorenses que importa lutar contra isto, não aos portugueses. A esses somente lhes compete ajudar, mas quando são os próprios donos da capoeira a meter as raposas dentro do galinheiro… muito pouco há a fazer.
A entrega de Timor-Leste começou em Cipinang.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 05:20
Policy and Society (National University of Singapore)- Volume 25 Number 4, 2006
Richard Tanter 1
Determining the social, political and economic basis of the outbreak of violence in Timor during early 2006 leads to questions about the nature and form of that conflict itself and its implications for Australian security policy. Until questions about the nature of recent political dynamics in East Timor and the intersection of patronage politics, foreign linkages and the possible manipulation of regional identity are determined, we cannot be sure of the kind of conflict the Timorese and those who would help them at risk of their lives are facing.
*Editors’ Note: This article, drafted in the middle of the crisis which erupted in East Timor during April 2006, is presented here as then written.
The dominant characteristic of the coverage of East Timor in May and June has been utter confusion, both inside and outside the country. The simple and clear narrative of the long hard decades leading up to September 1999 of good Timorese seeking self-determination and bad Indonesian military colonialists has been replaced by doubt and confusion amongst both Timorese and outside observers. Even well-informed foreign observers admitted their uncertainty about what was actually happening and why – though many of less well informed operated under no such restraint, thereby adding to the confusion.
The violent events in East Timor in the past two weeks should not really have been a surprise. There had been little explicit warning in the foreign press prior to the army mutiny two months ago. Most critical commentary outside the country to that date concentrated on just two issues – the tensions between justice and reconciliation over the crimes of the Indonesian military and their Timorese militias leading up to independence, and the protracted and unhappy negotiations between the newly independent country and Australia over the division of oil and gas revenues from the Timor Sea fields.
Yet over the past half year or more disturbing signs had been seeping through the generally benign but uninforming portrayal of post-independence Timor Leste. Two were particularly distressing. The first was the 2006 Human Development Report for Timor Leste from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2006), showing that that the poorest country in a poor region was becoming markedly poorer and more desperate, with almost every indicator of health and collective well-being in decline. After two and a half decades of the depredations of Indonesian military colonialism, this was a bitter pill. The second signal, with even worse connotations, was a report in April by Human Rights.
Even without more detailed knowledge, these were enough to set off alarms that the hard-fought for self-determination was no more than a necessary condition for peace and human security in East Timor, and that there was more to the explanation of the misery of many thousands of people than the continuing antipathy of the Indonesian military and the arrogance and shortsightedness of the Australian government in the oil negotiations, important as they undoubtedly were.
This is a moment when we need to take stock, to admit uncertainty, and carefully explore the underlying dynamics of a situation that is as complex as it is dangerous. The media are full of plenty of instant diagnoses, some from the usual suspects (“failed states” and “Australian coup d’ etat” are two popular lines that we hear a lot of). But this is really a time for a little humility amongst the foreign pundits and experts.
Here are ten questions to which we need some substantial answers and preferably some serious debate.
1. What inhibited the Alkatiri administration from effectively addressing the army rebellion and the antagonisms between the army and the police? Why were the divisive recruiting policies of the army and the police allowed to take root?
The first public signs of rebellion were many months ago. Insiders must have been aware of severe distress long before that. Nothing about control of armed force in small weak states should ever be allowed to drift. The only explanations offered to date have been either in terms of personalities, both inside the Council of Ministers and within the armed forces (FDTL) and the police (PNTL), or in overly simple terms of “ethnicity” and region. The army recruited mainly ex-Falantil guerrilla fighters, by default of their survival, mostly from the east of the country. The police, disproportionately from the west, allowed in former members of the Indonesian police force, and according to some, substantial numbers of former militia. But the key question is not about the policies, but why the Council of Ministers could not or would not reverse these dynamics.
To answer that, we need much more than just caricatures of “bad Alkatiri, good Gusmao”. To some degree these policies were in place by UNTAET before the transition to independence, but the question still remains as to why sophisticated and perceptive political figures such as Mari Alkatiri and Jose Ramos Horta were unable to rein in the Ministers of Defence (Roque Rodrigues) and Interior (Rogerio Lobato), and the FDTL’s chief, Major-General Taur Matan Ruak. For this we need a clearer account of the politics of the administration, and not simple abuse about “failing states”.
2. What have been the key political dynamics in East Timor postindependence?
Remarkably little informed analysis has been available about the politics of East Timor since the August 2001 parliamentary elections and the subsequent presidential election in April 2002. As a result of the 2001 elections, Fretilin holds 55 out of 88 seats in the parliament, and its leader Mari Alkatiri is prime minister. Much has been made by foreign commentators of Alkatiri’s unpopularity, but until the elections scheduled for later this year or early next year, this is untested. More seriously, here in Australia we have seen little careful analysis of the real state of Fretilin, the role played by the party in Alkatiri’s administration, and the popularity and positions of the more substantial opposition parties, such as the Democratic party.
The less than democratic conduct of the recent Fretilin Congress did not help matters either internally or externally, leaving the party more vulnerable to charges of favouritism and collusion and cover-up of the Council of Ministers’ ineffectiveness.
Apart from Helen Hill’s recent careful but brief review of the actual characteristics and achievements of Alkatiri’s policy approach (Hill 2006b), there has been almost no serious Australian media coverage of policy debates in East Timor in recent years, apart from the question of oil and gas negotiations, questions of language policy, and the reconciliation vs. justice for those accused of war crimes.
Fundamental issues about livelihood, poverty, health, the distribution of the benefits of oil and gas revenues to the people of the country, and the actual effects of government budget and foreign aid to the communities and infrastructure of the country – all of which are matters of great debate inside East Timor and some careful analysis in Timorese and outside policy circles – have been left unreported in the wider media.
3. Is the framework of “ethnic tensions” and “easterners vs. westerners” the real key to the current political dynamics, or is there some other organising factor behind the riots?
Long-time observers of East Timorese society and politics are both sceptical and surprised about the deep salience of this divide. This is an old split that appeared to lose much of its salience during the war of resistance against a common enemy. Helen Hill (2006a) has argued that marriage patterns show a much more complex, nuanced reality. Moreover, as she has pointed out, most political organisations in fact span this “divide”, with members from both regions. And whatever the case, the lazy use of “ethnic tensions” is surely inappropriate in such an ethnically diverse country. If this is a divide, real or manufactured, it is around matters of regional benefit and deprivation.
Yet the army and police divisions have certainly expressed themselves in part along this fault line. The accretion in the police of numbers of people from the western part of the country who had closer relations with the Indonesian occupiers show that it is not simply a matter of geography or “ethnicity”. Rather “east/west” became to some extent at least a reflection of the unfinished business of the reconciliation vs. justice debate, and the politics of patronage. This is not at all to say the division is a mirage, but rather we need to look a lot harder at how regional division has overlaid other lines of conflict with nothing to do with region.
More importantly, we have almost no informed reports on the political dynamics of the uses and promotion of this division either within the army and the police or amongst the well-organised rioters. “Conflict entrepreneurs” is a term well suited to those who are exploiting confused situations like this. We know that text messages on mobile phones – some based on honest fears, some intended to manufacture fear based on false information – were skilfully used to cause terror, confusion and flight. We also know that rioters and teams of young men targeting particular individuals – to burn houses, loot government departments and agencies, intimidate and in some cases to murder – have been coordinated by mobile phone. Criminal gangs have also used mobile phones to coordinate lootings. The key question is who was coordinating these destabilising political actions? Is more than one elite group using such tactics? Who is coordinating with whom? It appears to be a complex situation with more than one set of oppositions as well as different opportunists involved.
4. What does Australia know about the dynamics of violence in East Timor this time?
While the Australian media has reported the violence in terms of roaming bands of young men and odd groups of police and army personnel, divided along “east/west” lines, the Australian government certainly knows that this media picture of aimless and apparently spontaneous violence is not correct. Australian intelligence organisations – especially our electronic intelligence collection agency, the Defence Signals Division – have the means to catch, decrypt and analyse all mobile phone and radio conversations in East Timor. Undoubtedly the Australian Secret Intelligence Service would have retained some of its earlier capacities in East Timor. This is precisely what DSD did in 1999 and what gave InterFET such a decisive advantage over the Indonesian military and its militia. As in 1999, the Australian government would have had access to advance warning that groups were planning some kinds of political intervention. In their meeting this week, Mr Downer appeared to have intimated to President Gusmao that Australia had such information on current planning of riots. The key questions then are what did the Australian government know through its intelligence sources in the run up to the eruption of violence, and with whom did it share this knowledge? In 1999 the Australian government kept its considerable forewarning of the conflagration being planned by the TNI to come from its own citizens, from its American ally, and of course, from the people of East Timor about to be its victims.
5. Are there external factors at work – Australian or Indonesian?
Those in Australia looking for evidence of an “Australian coup” will be convinced by the likes of the Australian’s Greg Sheridan:
Certainly if Alkatiri remains Prime Minister of East Timor, this is a shocking indictment of Australian impotence. If you cannot translate the leverage of 1300 troops, 50 policemen, hundreds of support personnel, buckets of aid and a critical international rescue mission into enough influence to get rid of a disastrous Marxist Prime Minister, then you are just not very skilled in the arts of influence, tutelage, sponsorship and, ultimately, promoting the national interest (Sheridan 2006).
Undoubtedly the Australian government would prefer someone other than the economic nationalist Alkatiri to lead East Timor. The real question is whether such a preference would lead it to support the murder and mayhem of the present eruption, and the certain long run destabilisation of Timorese politics that would now ensue. On balance, the answer is no. Alkatiri and Fretilin were due to face an election in a matter of months in any case. Australian bullying and arrogance is undoubtedly the order of the day, but not, in this case, coupmaking. On the other hand, given the swaggering stance of the Australian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, it is not surprising that, as Loro Horta said: “Many members of the Dili government are far more concerned over Australian indentations than they are over Jakarta’s.
Many believe that Australia and the U.S. are to some extent behind the crisis” (Horta 2006).
While Horta regards this notion as bizarre, the front page blusterings of the Sheridan camp feed the anxiety, and would appear to reflect some strands of Australian government thinking – thus at the very least complicating the task of the ADF and AFP personnel on the ground.
A more serious question has to be asked about Indonesian intervention – or more precisely, intervention by particular groups in Indonesia. When Mari Alkatiri was reported – incorrectly – as having accused Indonesia of being behind the riots, the Indonesian Foreign Minister denied any such intervention, and his denial should be taken seriously. But that does not mean taking it at face value. Much happens in the Indonesian state that is no longer under the control of the president and his advisors. In particular, recent events in Papua have demonstrated that the president’s pro-autonomy policy in Papua is being actively undermined by the military, the most important intelligence agency and by the Ministry of the Interior (Chauvel 2006). That is not to say that there is any proof that any of these organisations – or civil society organisations linked to them – have been involved in East Timor, but it certainly means that the Foreign Minister’s denial, honourable in intent though it may have been, is not the last word on the matter. Moreover since the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 began with intelligence agencies’ destabilisation of Timorese politics, history leads us to err on the side of caution, and with an eye for links at one remove from the immediate action.
Possible Indonesian involvement in at least three elements of the present violence and chaos need to be examined carefully. The first is the two attacks on repositories of records of investigations and testimonies about the crimes of the 1975-1999 period, both Indonesian and Timorese. The UN Serious Crimes Unit office was looted, with files relating to Indonesian army officers criminal actions stolen, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Secretariat (CAVR) building was attacked by about 100 armed men. There are no copies of the CAVR materials held outside East Timor.
The second issue that needs careful examination for any trace of Indonesian links – official or otherwise – is the behaviour of the East Timorese police. Accused by Human Rights Watch of illegal detention and torture, the ongoing links of senior police who began their careers in the Indonesian police needs careful scrutiny – especially in the “east-west” context, and the abandonment of court actions for past crimes in favour of reconciliation.
The third issue is both the most important and the most difficult to assess: which groups are behind the organised rioting, looting, and killing of the past two weeks. This was Alkatiri’s actual question. Have militia connections no salience? Have cross-border linkages beyond matters of kinship no relevance?
Have the intrigues of East Timorese politics no connection to the ongoing activities of Indonesian-based former militia leaders with longstanding Indonesian intelligence links such as Eurico Guterres? Most importantly, the focus must be on the organization of the chaos – whether the East Timorese formateurs of violence are singular or multiple, and whether they act entirely without outside links.
These are questions that have to be asked, and it is in the interests of democrats in East Timor, Indonesia, and Australia that they be both asked and answered. Given the past behaviour and ongoing behaviour of both the Indonesian army and the Indonesian intelligence agencies, this is not a time for taking offence just because the questions are put. And given the arrogance of the Australian government’s behaviour, the blind rush to the status of regional mini-hegemon, and its misleading of its own population about what its intelligence agencies knew last time, there is every reason to scrutinize the long run intentions and assumptions behind Australian intervention.
6. Does Operation Astute have adequate – and appropriate – resources for the job?
As in 1999 Australian armed intervention was an urgent necessity, whatever the subsequent damage caused by Howard’s triumphalism then and its echoes now.
But there are very real doubts about Australian capacities this time round. Not only is the situation on the ground much more confused than in the orchestrated chaos of 1999, but as many commentators have rightly said, Australian military and policing resources are stretched much more thinly over a very wide range of conflicts. Specialised Australian military personnel suitable for such interventions are in fact always small in numbers – the three units that makes up the Special Operations Command (the SAS and two commando groups) and the Army’s Airborne battle Group, with the 3rd battalion (parachute) Royal Australian Regiment (RAR).
Operation Astute is staffed by military personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Portugal, and the US has lent logistical assistance. Both Australia and Portugal have deployed police groups, in the Australian case, 57 Australian Federal Police officers. Australian military personnel are mainly from 3 RAR – some just back from Iraq (others are still deployed in the Solomons) – and a smaller number from 4 RAR.2 Confusion about who to target, suitable rules of engagement, strategy and simple lack of numbers inhibited the effectiveness of the force for a time after landing. While a greater degree of physical control was established, even now there is no comprehensive police protection against looting and assault, as the raid on the CAVR building demonstrated.
The CAVR looting demonstrates another side to the lack of capacity of the intervention force. When the organised mass looting of the CAVR building began – only motorbikes were taken in the end – CAVR Timorese staff called the ADF, to be told that they did not have enough personnel to deal with looters at that time. What is most disturbing about this is not so much the lack of resources as the failure to recognize the political and legal importance of those CAVR archives and the need to protect them as a priority. This tends to confirm one suggestion that the ADF – or at least the part that had to carry out the rapid reaction role – was prepared in terms of intelligence and language preparation in the same way that they were in 1999. It is important to remember that this is an international force, with all the inherent problems of such formation – including arguments about command.3 Present military and police and intelligence commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands and elsewhere have stretched Australian capacity to contribute to as effective a force as may be necessary in East Timor.
Moreover, the ambiguities about Australian longterm intentions mean that as soon as possible it would be wise to widen the international character of the intervention and policing force. Leaving aside any arguments about the desirability (or absurdity) of Australian thoughts of regional hegemony and the dangerous and foolish involvement in the Iraq catastrophe, the reality is that Australian capacities are in fact quite small, and vulnerable to both breakdown and discrediting.
This leads to questions about the desirability of Australian forces staying in East Timor for an extended period, or whether it would be in the interests of both East Timor and Australia for the Australian government to press the Security Council for replacement forces from other countries. This is 1999, and the chances for the hard-pressed and over-extended forces of the ADF to make mistakes in a confusing situation are that much higher – with the political costs higher still. The fact that the AFP is now to be supplemented by 100 officers drawn from state police forces is clear evidence about the over-extension in terms of numbers. Needless to say, the limits of the Howard government’s Mini Me notion of regional hegemony are much more evident in Southeast Asia than they are in the Pacific.
7. What is the likely and desirable future role of the United Nations?
Often it has seemed that critics of the UN role in East Timor have been completely contradictory, some saying that the United Nations handed over power to an independent East Timor too soon, others that it stayed too long and weighed too heavily. Undoubtedly, despite its achievements there were undesirable aspects to the prolonged UN presence in what was really a new form of governance. But on the whole it would have to be judged a success, if not in quite such glowing terms as some of its advocates have suggested. Many of the problems attributed to the UN presence itself in fact can be traced to the wider issues of the role and impact of large numbers of foreign advisers in a diverse range of international government and non-government bodies, and to policies of other international agencies.
The dispatch of the experienced Ian Martin as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General is a welcome move, but it is not now clear what the next move will be. Some have called for a resumption of UN control; others have seen this as an external coup by another name. It is most unlikely that there will be any relinquishing of formal sovereignty by the government of Timor-Leste, but equally, there are a myriad lines of leverage from both the UN and its important member countries – in this case, the US, Japan, with Australia leading the charge. When Ian Martin reports to the Secretary-General, there may well be important questions about how the UN should exercise its ongoing responsibility to East Timor, the answers to which are not obvious.
The constitution of the new country was developed under UN tutelage, and the questions arises as to what the attitude of the Security Council should be to the constitutional forms of government in the face of the assault on the government, as well as its inability to maintain order.
The reported agreement by Mari Alkatiri to accept a proposal by the UN representative in East Timor, Hasegawa Sukehiro, that his role in events leading up to the crisis should be the subject of investigation by international prosecutors is important both politically and legally – and in both cases with both short-term and long-term implications.4 Assuming that such an investigation would have a wider brief than just the role of Dr Alkatiri, and also assuming this involves a reactivation of the UN Serious Crimes Unit or some similar successor body, this is an important extension of the idea of the universal jurisdiction of the Security Council with global implications. East Timor was the first occasion of direct UN post-conflict governance, and much was learned. It is now clear that that experiment in a new hybrid of global responsibility and local sovereignty is not yet over.
8. Where does the debate about “justice vs. reconciliation” now stand?
No leader of the Indonesian military or militia has had to face serious consequences for their conduct in East Timor up until September 1999. The Indonesian trials were a disgraceful and contemptuous farce, and the United Nations Security Council has taken the necessary step to establish an international tribunal. In East Timor itself, the president’s strong preference for a basically non-judgmental reconciliation process won out over calls for comprehensive and effective justice. To some degree that decision was motivated by pragmatism – the need to get along with Indonesia, lack of funds, and lack of firm international will to support the process to the end. But without suggesting that that was an easy choice to make at the time, it would now seem that there has been a price to be paid: justice was not seen to be done, justified resentments festered, confidence in policing and legal systems not fostered, and possibly institutional legacies of Indonesian rule not adequately challenged, for example in the police.
Whatever the role in the current crisis of those guilty in the events leading up to 1999 may turn out to be, there are now very grave crimes committed by East Timorese against East Timorese – civilian, army and police. Moreover there are allegations that the government itself either ordered or instigated murderous assaults on its political opponents.
Does the political and legal system have the capacity to deal with these crimes effectively? The apparently imminent reactivation of the UN Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor will go some way towards resolving this matter, but more serious thought needs to be given to repairing the damage in public confidence done not only by the violence of the past months, but by the failure to prosecute the crimes of the Indonesian period. The consequences of the failure by the United States, Australia and Japan to press for an international tribunal to do the work of the disgraced Indonesian judicial system and the tiny overtaxed East Timorese legal system are now evident.
Once again the East Timorese have paid the price of great power – and I use the term loosely – realpolitik. With luck, the only Australian costs will be in money and prestige. But it is now time to realise that the documentation of human rights abuses and the application of universal jurisdiction in matters of serious crimes against humanity is in fact in matters of sheer political realism in the interests of all, and not an optional extra in international politics.
9. Is oil the answer or the curse?
Many both inside and outside East Timor have pinned their hopes for the future on the revenues from the Timor Sea oil and gas fields. Understandably many have been preoccupied with the urgent need to pressure Australia to offer East Timor a large share of the revenues – in its own self-interest if not for reasons of justice. Important and necessary as this process is and will continue to be, it does not in itself answer the question as to just how these hopefully increased revenues will benefit the country as a whole. This brings us back to perhaps the most unexplored aspect of East Timor’s post-independence political dynamics: the politics of patronage. We should expect patronage politics to be one part of the normal political modus operandi of East Timorese society given its economic and social structure. While there is a built-in tendency to what western and industrial capitalist societies view as simple matters of corruption and nepotism, this need not always be so. However, there have been many allegations of corruption in East Timor, but little hard evidence and serious analysis. But there are three key variables that make the patronage politics of Timor at present somewhat dangerous.
The first, and much remarked on, is the relatively large impact of external aid and foreign advisers. This is one subject on which a lot has been written, but not – to my knowledge at least – on the intersection of these external flows and the structure of domestic patronage, and the political intersection of “traditional” and “modern” economic sectors.
The second is the political nature of oil itself. Thirty years ago the Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuscinski put the Janus promise of oil well: “The concept of oil perfectly expresses the eternal human dream of wealth achieved through a kiss of fortune, and not by sweat, anguish, hard work. In this sense, oil is a fairy tale, and like every fairy tale, a bit of a lie”.
The lesson of almost every case is that oil brings smelly politics, especially at the intersection of government and business. We know little about the details of East Timor’s oil politics beyond the dispute with Australia. The role of oil money – or hopes for it – in the present dispute or set of disputes has not been talked about, but it is potentially so large a basis for political capital that it must be looked at, especially given the mysterious character of the inner dynamics of the present crisis.
With both police and army using their advanced small arms on a freelance basis in alliance with different groupings, and 1500 Glock pistols and their ammunition looted from the police arsenal, the faceless but undoubtedly active and well resourced conflict entrepreneurs still have plenty of fuel to play with.
10. What kind of war?
The question of the social and political and economic relations that lie behind this outbreak of violence in Timor leads to a question about the nature and form of that war itself, with implications for Australian security policy. Until the questions already discussed about the nature of the current political dynamics of East Timor and the intersection of patronage politics, foreign linkages, and the possible manipulation of regional identity are answered we cannot be sure of the kind of conflict the Timorese and those who would help them at risk of their lives are facing. We know enough to be sure that this is not 1999, and that it is highly confused and confusing.
The best guide to the worst possible answer to this question comes from Mary Kaldor’s evolving analysis over the last decade of the new kind of conflict she labels “new wars”. Some aspects of her summary description bear uncomfortably on the current crisis in East Timor and its ugly possibilities. Let me finish with an extended quotation from one of her early formulations in the hope that it turns out to be inappropriate:
It is the lack of authority of the state, the weakness of representation, the loss of confidence that the state is able or willing to respond to public concerns, the inability and/or unwillingness to regulate the privatisation and informalisation of violence that gives rise to violent conflicts. Moreover, this ‘uncivilising process’, tends to be reinforced by the dynamics of the conflicts, which have the effect of further reordering political, economic and social relationships in a negative spiral of incivility.
I call the conflicts ‘wars’ because of their political character although they could also be described as massive violations of human rights (repression against civilians) and organised crime (violence for private gain). They are about access to state power. They are violent struggles to gain access to or to control the state. Privatised violence and unregulated social relations feed on each other. In these wars, physical destruction is very high, tax revenues plummet further, and unemployment is very high. The various parties finance themselves through loot and plunder and various forms of illegal trading; thus they are closely linked into and help to generate organised crime networks. They also depend on support from neighbouring states, Diaspora groups, and humanitarian assistance.
In the majority of cases, these wars are fought in the name of identity – a claim to power on the basis of labels. These are wars in which political identity is defined in terms of exclusive labels -ethnic, linguistic, or religious – and the wars themselves give meaning to the labels. Labels are mobilised for political purposes; they offer a new sense of security in a context where the political and economic certainties of previous decades have evaporated. They provide a new populist form of communitarian ideology, a way to maintain or capture power, that uses the language and forms of an earlier period. Undoubtedly, these ideologies make use of pre-existing cleavages and the legacies of past wars. But nevertheless, it is the deliberate manipulation of these sentiments, often assisted by Diaspora funding and techniques and speeded up through the electronic media, that is the immediate cause of conflict (Kaldor 2000; and see Kaldor 1999).
1. Thanks to Gerry Van Klinken, Glenda Lasslett, David Bourchier, and Helen Hill for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2. The Wikipedia article on Operation Astute is, at least at the time of writing, an excellent source on the international military intervention force. To date, Nick Dowling has been its main contributor. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Astute.
3. ‘Portugal refuses Australian command in E Timor’, ABC News, 3 June 2006. Available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200606/s1654401.htm.
4. ‘Alkatiri agrees to UN investigation’, Peter Cave, ABC News, 7 June 2006. Available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200606/s1657422.htm.
Chauvel, Richard. 2006. ‘Australia, Indonesia and the Papuan Crises’. Austral Policy Forum 06-14A, 27 April. Available at http://nautilus.rmit.edu.au/forum-reports/0614a-chauvel.html.
Hill, Helen . 2006a. ‘Regional Tensions’, East Timor Mailing List, 28 May.
________. 2006b. ‘Stand up, the real Mr Alkatiri’, The Age, 1 June. Available at
Horta, Loro. 2006. ‘Caution over Timor Leste’, Jakarta Post, 7 June. Available at
Human Rights Watch. 2006. ‘Tortured Beginnings: Police Violence and the Beginnings of Impunity in East Timor’, April 2006. Available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/easttimor0406/.
Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Available at http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/010kaldor.htm.
________. 2000. ‘Cosmopolitanism and Organised Violence’. Paper prepared for Conference on ‘Conceiving Cosmopolitanism’, Warwick, 27-29 April 2000.
Sheridan, Greg. 2006. ‘Throw Troops at Pacific failures’, The Australian, 3 June. Available at
UNDP. 2006. ‘Timor-Leste faces Development Challenges’, March 8. The full report: ‘The Path Out of Poverty’, available at
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 03:45
Margarida deixou um novo comentário na sua mensagem "Oficial português difere de CEMGFA timorense sobre...":
1 – Disse o brigadeiro-general Taur Matan Ruak no Tribunal na semana passada“que o tiroteio em Caicoli, junto ao ministério da Justiça, parou a pedido do coronel Fernando Reis e elementos da ONU, porque elementos das PNTL desejavam render-se.
«Os membros das Nações Unidas não pediram ou não ordenaram às F-FDTL para se desarmarem e retirar do Ministério da Justiça e outros locais».
«Continuavam a dizer que a PNTL desejava render-se, sem explicar os pormenores da rendição».
«Os dois membros da ONU seguiram para o quartel-general da PNTL, dei ordens aos membros (das F-FDTL) para pararem os tiroteios e assim aconteceu».
2 – Disse o comissário Nuno Anaia, hoje no Tribunal que “o brigadeiro-general Taur Matan Ruak concordou com um cessar-fogo.
«Sei que o coronel Fernando Reis chegou a acordo com o brigadeiro-general Taur Matan Ruak para um cessar-fogo com algumas condições».
«As condições eram que os PNTL entregassem as armas, que saíssem do quartel-general da Polícia a pé e que saíssem com as Nações Unidas».
3 - É o próprio Relatório da COI quem diz que pela UNOTIL “Não foi reunida qualquer equipa de gestão de crise”, não houve “uma estratégia de comunicação, com as autoridades nacionais”, nem “nenhum plano colectivo foi divisado para a intervenção”.
Que não houve “suficientes canais de comunicação antes de ou durante a intervenção”. Que “nenhuma directiva específica foi dada às pessoas” e que “se depositaram grandes esperanças nas experiências pessoais de militar e de polícia de determinados indivíduos”.
Parece-me que nem o relatório da COI tem as certezas que tem o Comissário.
Por Malai Azul 2 à(s) 00:58
Obrigado pela solidariedade, Margarida!
Mensagem inicial - 16 de Maio de 2006
"Apesar de frágil, Timor-Leste é uma jovem democracia em que acreditamos. É o país que escolhemos para viver e trabalhar. Desde dia 28 de Abril muito se tem dito sobre a situação em Timor-Leste. Boatos, rumores, alertas, declarações de países estrangeiros, inocentes ou não, têm servido para transmitir um clima de conflito e insegurança que não corresponde ao que vivemos. Vamos tentar transmitir o que se passa aqui. Não o que ouvimos dizer... "